

REPORT TO THE
SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL
WTO ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW COMMITTEE

PREPARATIONS AND PLANNING PANEL

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August 24, 2000

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 25, 1999 Mayor Paul Schell announced that the White House had chosen Seattle to be the site of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference. Holding the conference in Seattle was portrayed as a coup that would bring millions of dollars in revenues to local business owners. More importantly, hosting the WTO Ministerial Conference would solidify Seattle's reputation as a "world class" city and place us at the hub of international trade. Unfortunately, none of the publicly stated benefits would come to pass, as the WTO Conference became one of the most disruptive events in Seattle's history.

Panel Two of the Accountability Review Committee was charged with reviewing the planning and preparations leading up to the week of WTO. The panel's task was to determine not only what went wrong but also *how* it went wrong. To do so, Councilmember Nick Licata selected panel members from different walks of life, representing broad perspectives and community interests.

The primary goal of our report is to establish a factual record and to assist in future policy-making by the city council. It is our hope that the council does more than read our conclusions. It is our intent that they use the lessons learned from this extensive evaluation and reduce them to ordinances that can prevent what occurred from happening again.

It is our belief that much of what occurred during the week of November 28, 1999 should have been anticipated. Contrary to Seattle Mayor Paul Schell's and the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) protestations of ignorance about the number of demonstrators and the tactics they would use, we found ample documentation that indicates that they were fully apprised of what to expect, and inexplicably ignored the warnings.

In an attempt to understand the decisions made that led to the disastrous week of tear gas, burning dumpsters, and injured citizens, it is important to understand the security plan's underlying rationale. Representatives from the Seattle Host Organization, City of Seattle Executive Office and WTO Public Safety Committee decided to follow the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting (APEC) model. However, they used the model loosely at best, applying it piecemeal for security planning and not at all for overall coordination of activities and functions.

Further, the decision to use the APEC model was flawed because the APEC model was inadequate for the WTO Ministerial. The focus for APEC was on developing a security plan for numerous heads of state, and didn't take into account mass demonstrations featuring civil disobedience. More appropriate models were available, such as that used for the 1990 Goodwill Games, but they were apparently forgotten.

Prior to Seattle being awarded the conference, representatives from the Seattle Police Department, the Seattle Mayor's Office and the Seattle Host Organization* (SHO) were

* The WTO bid committee, which became the SHO executive committee, included: Governor Gary Locke, King County Executive Ron Sims, Mayor Paul Schell, Patricia Davis (WCIT), Bill Gates (Microsoft), and Phil Condit (Boeing).

all briefed* about the riots that occurred at the 1998 WTO Conference in Geneva. Yet all parties persisted in dismissing this, and other clear indications of violence and large numbers of demonstrators that SPD's colleagues at other public safety agencies took very seriously.

Reasons for discounting the information provided can only be inferred. Based upon the information we have been able to gather, budget constraints and the ambiguity of outside sources of funding seemed to be the primary factor in deciding whether or not to take the threats seriously. If SPD believed the threat assessments, then they would know that 600 commissioned police officers would not be enough to adequately monitor 50,000 demonstrators, much less prevent violent activities and/or arrest and detain those who participated in civil disobedience.

If SPD believed what were, by their own account, "thorough and accurate" threat assessments, they would have been required to request additional personnel from other law enforcement agencies in advance of the WTO Ministerial for training, planning and deployment. A request for assistance in advance of any emergency would have required SPD to guarantee reimbursement of the costs incurred by the supporting agency. SPD was unwilling to provide those guarantees, therefore, many police departments refused to provide additional officers.

Throughout our investigation we wondered who was in charge. Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper was curiously missing in action during the planning. Mayor Schell consciously left the key security issues to the WTO Public Safety Committee. He focused primarily on keeping costs down, ensuring that WTO delegates and officials were comfortable and adequately entertained, and accommodating peaceful protesters. The Seattle Host Organization's concern with security was limited to making sure they had enough protection for dignitaries and delegates. The panel found that the WTO Conference deteriorated into chaos and violence due to:

- 1) Poor planning and preparation;
- 2) Limited coordination among Mayor Paul Schell, the Seattle Police Department, and the Seattle Host Organization; and,
- 3) A pattern of leaders at every level abdicating their responsibilities throughout the planning process.

Who Was Responsible?

The ultimate responsibility for the failings of the WTO Planning and Preparation rests with Mayor Paul Schell. As a member of the Seattle Host Committee, Mayor Schell did not ensure that the financial interests of Seattle were protected. Much of the work of planning and implementation was delegated to executive staff, which is to be expected. However, the mayor's responsibility to the citizens of Seattle dictates the need to personally review and understand the details of plans for any event that requires a great deal of public resources. We contend that the mayor should have taken a more active role in planning and preparation earlier in the process, thereby providing significantly

* Participants in the meetings included: Mayor Schell, Councilmember Sue Donaldson, Councilmember Martha Choe, Keith Orton (Seattle Office of Intergovernmental Relations), Assistant Chief Harv Ferguson (SPD), Captain Ron Mochizuki (SPD), Lieutenant Bill Moffat (SPD), Patricia Davis (WCIT), William Stafford (Trade Development Alliance and SHO) and other members of the board of WCIT.

more oversight over key components of the security and hosting plan. We further contend that the mayor abdicated his primary responsibility as steward and advocate for the overall interests of the citizens of Seattle.

For example, the estimated costs to provide security quickly escalated from the original \$1.5 million price tag to \$5 million, and yet the mayor continued to rely on Ray Waldmann's, Pat Davis' and the Seattle Host Organization's promise to provide \$1.5 million "**if they were able to raise \$9 million**". Neither Mayor Schell nor his staff were willing to hold SHO or Davis' organization, the Washington Council on International Trade* (WCIT), accountable for ensuring that Seattle was reimbursed for the security costs by securing explicit promises or agreements. Mayor Schell's decision to not request funding from the federal government in advance of the event in order to make Seattle's proposal to host the conference more attractive was a tremendous hindrance to developing outside sources of funding. The ambiguity of the amount and source of funding impacted the Seattle Police Department's officer deployment strategy, equipment purchases, and multi-agency officer training.

While Mayor Schell is ultimately responsible, SPD Assistant Chief Ed Joiner bears heavy responsibility as the chair of the WTO Public Safety Committee. Joiner's failures, and they were many, greatly contributed to the mayor's poor decisions. Specifically, he did not press for the higher budget request; he did not train SPD forces with the other mutual aid police forces; he did not have a proper plan to relieve officers; and, he oversaw a process that exposed uninvolved citizens, peaceful protestors and commissioned law enforcement officers to unreasonable risks.

While it is tempting to lay the primary responsibility for the failure of the security planning solely at Assistant Chief Joiner's doorstep, it is sadly clear to Panel Two that the primary responsibility is shared by former SPD Chief Norm Stamper. It quickly became apparent to us that the lack of a predefined budget, inadequate training of officers, inadequate communications systems, discounted threat assessments, inadequate security planning and lack of coordination with the Seattle Host Organization contributed to the chaos that ensued. Chief Stamper was one of a very few individuals with enough authority to demand a more realistic security plan. Chief Stamper's failure to provide leadership and to ensure fiscal accountability contributed to the lack of proper planning, which placed the lives of police officers and citizens at risk and contributed to the violation of protestors' constitutional rights.

The responsibility of the Seattle Host Organization was hosting events and receptions, organizing accommodations, and managing delegates' transportation. For all intents and purposes the majority of the planning work of the SHO was successful. **Their greatest failing was not raising the funds to cover the costs incurred.** The corporate members of SHO, who included the members of WCIT represented by Port Commissioner Pat Davis, felt no responsibility for ensuring that the full costs of the conference were raised. Further, they felt justified in reimbursing the city only a fraction of what they promised. The elected members of SHO (the Governor, King County Executive and City of Seattle Mayor) failed to exercise due diligence in preventing the costs of a private function from being absorbed by the taxpayers. In short, the corporate

* The Washington Council on International Trade, is a private non-profit corporation founded by the Port of Seattle, Bank of America, and Weyerhaeuser Company, dedicated to the promotion of international trade in Washington.

members of the WCIT and SHO hosted a private and exclusive international networking conference that will probably yield long-term financial gains to those corporate interests using taxpayer dollars and resources.

Finally, it is worth noting that the panel's review was hampered by public officials who rather than being forthcoming, chose to obfuscate the issues by using carefully worded, and possibly disingenuous, phrases in response to direct questions, and claiming ignorance of facts later found in documentation. The Seattle Police Department also hindered our ability to do a thorough review by insisting, in writing, that they had provided us with all relevant documentation, only to provide three additional boxes of key documents late in our investigative process and after tremendous pressure was applied by the city council.

In the final analysis, the WTO Ministerial conference was a planning and preparation failure. Public officials with too little experience in the coordination of this kind of event were given too much latitude and decision-making authority. Elected officials, whose job it is to protect the public's interest, exercised too little oversight and failed to enact accountability measures. Corporate "partners" were anxious to host this event in Seattle at any cost — as long as they didn't have to absorb the costs.

Undue thrift and, perhaps, greed contributed to the circumstances that put the lives of citizens and police officers at risk. The desire to become a "world class" city "on the cheap" led to the streets of Seattle becoming a battleground which was ultimately responsible for violating the constitutional rights of demonstrators and non-participating bystanders. We hope that our city leaders will truly use the lessons learned from this experience.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

Seattle City Council members Nick Licata, Jan Drago, and Jim Compton led the efforts of the Seattle Council to examine what went wrong during the WTO Ministerial in order to prevent a similar outcome in the future. Through the leadership of these councilmembers, the city council passed Seattle City Council Resolution 30100. This resolution established an Accountability Review Committee (ARC) to “review events surrounding the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle.”

The Committee appointed the Preparations and Planning Panel to “determine what planning and decisions by city employees, including police and elected officials, and by other community members and organizations, preceded the City's hosting of the WTO Conference.” The goal was to establish a factual record and to assist in future policy-making by the Seattle City Council.

The planning and preparations for the 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial spanned a ten-month period, beginning with the announcement in late January 1999 that Seattle had been selected to host the Ministerial.

The full text of the panel's charge is included in Appendix A.

B. Membership and Process

Councilmember Nick Licata selected the persons listed below as participants on the panel because they represent various perspectives and interests within the community. They are as follows:

Norma Kelsey
Sister Kathleen Pruitt
Carl Livingston
Clark Pickett
Angela Toussaint
Beth Wojick
Kay Godefroy

The Panel met on a biweekly basis from February through August, 2000. Carl Livingston was named as chair. Two members, Wojick and Godefroy, were unable to continue attending when the panel extended its work into the summer. Starting in April, Dian Ferguson aided the group by facilitating meetings. Biographical information on the panel members is included in Appendix B.

Public Openness and Accountability

The Panel decided to allow the public to attend meetings and participate in them. During the course of the meetings and interviews a number of citizens attended and helped shape the Panel's work.

Documents

The ARC Staff coded, processed, and prepared more than 18,000 pages of documents, from correspondence and facsimile transmittals to memoranda and reports. To avoid overwhelming panel members with the sheer volume of materials, the staff identified hundreds of relevant documents for the panel members to study. Any panel member was free to review any document in staff possession at any time and several did.

The document catalog is available through the WTO ARC website, www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee, as are several of the reports issued by various observers and participants. All of the documents were made available to the public through the City Clerk's Office. What follows is a list of the most important reports the Panel reviewed:

- Odenthal, Richard (LA Sheriff's Office) "The Battle in Seattle"
- Seattle Police Department After Action Report
- McCarthy & Associates, "An Independent Review of the World Trade Organization Conference Disruptions in Seattle, Washington November 29 – December 3, 1999."
- King County Sheriff's Office Draft After Action Report
- ACLU of Washington, "Out of Control: Seattle's Flawed Response to Protests Against the World Trade Organization."
- National Lawyers' Guild – Seattle Chapter, "Bringing in an Undemocratic Institution Brings an Undemocratic Response."

Interviews

The Panel formed an interview subcommittee charged with creating a list of proposed interviewees and conducting the interviews. Other panel members who were interested also helped conduct interviews. The interviewees included:

- Laurie Brown, Special Assistant to Mayor Schell
- Sally Soriano, People for Fair Trade
- Seattle Deputy Mayor Maud Daudon
- Seattle Mayor Paul Schell
- Ron Judd, King County Labor Council
- Cliff Traisman, City of Seattle Office of Intergovernmental Relations
- Ray Waldmann, Seattle Host Organization/Washington Council on International Trade
- King County Sheriff Dave Reichert
- Washington State Patrol Chief Annette Sandberg
- Captain Jim Pugel, Seattle Police Department
- City Attorney Mark Sidran
- Former Seattle Agent-in-Charge Burdena Pasenelli, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Seattle Agent-in-Charge Charles Mandigo, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Former Assistant Chief Ed Joiner, Seattle Police Department

The following individuals and/or organizations were not willing or unavailable to be interviewed by the panel:

- Ron Legan, US Secret Service
- Michael Pitts, consultant hired by SHO
- Karen Benjamin, US State Department

Where relevant, staff also made available transcripts of all or portions of interviews conducted by Panels One and Three. All tapes and transcripts were also available to the public through the City Clerk's Office.

The panel also asked WTO ARC staff to conduct other interviews that were taped and transcribed. On behalf of the panel, WTO ARC staff interviewed Chief Norm Stamper, Seattle Police Department.

Finally, WTO ARC staff conducted many background interviews that for various reasons (including agreements reached with the Seattle Police Management Association) could not be taped. The results, which often included suggestions of additional people to be interviewed for the record, were shared with the panel.

The "Matrix"

The Panel began its analysis by discussing what they believe the goals of the organizers should have been to ensure an 'ideal' event. The goals (and associated sub-goals) selected by the panel were:

1. Public safety is ensured.
 - There are no fatalities and/or grievous injuries.
 - There are no minor injuries.
2. There is protection against property damage.
 - There is no major property damage.
 - There is no minor property damage.
3. Rights of citizens to demonstrate and protest are protected.
 - Security of demonstrators is ensured.
4. Unlawful protesters are quickly detained.
5. Conference proceeds.
 - Delegates can access all conference locations.
6. Security of delegates is ensured.
7. Disruptions to daily life are minimized.
 - Civil society functions.
 - A sense of safety is promoted.
 - Downtown stores and businesses remain open.
8. City officials, particularly SPD, had appropriate plans for which they were properly trained and adequately staffed.

9. The event is fully funded and fiscally responsible, i.e. that a reasonable budget is developed and a reasonable effort is made to stay within it. *This issue was addressed by the WTO Invitation Panel.*

The panel then used these goals as a means to organize the vast quantity of information available, documenting the planning and preparations in matrix format. An explanation of the approach and the final version of the matrix are included as Appendix E.

III. FINDINGS

The panel has found that planning for the World Trade Organization Third Ministerial was badly flawed. The planning process for the conference was inadequate, and, in particular, the security planning for the event was woefully inadequate to the challenges faced by the City of Seattle. The planning failed in large part because several of the agencies involved did not realistically assess what would be required in order to have the conference and the city run smoothly during the week of the Ministerial.

A. Overall Conference Planning and Preparation

Local and federal organizations divided up the responsibility for organizing the event. Their roles were not well coordinated, and the informal, fractured approach to planning failed to cope with the problems presented by the WTO Ministerial.

A-1. The planning model was inappropriate to this event because it divided hosting and security considerations between the private and public sector with inadequate coordination.

Both the private and public sector planners modeled their planning approach after the approach that was used in Seattle in 1993 for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference and APEC leaders' meeting (featuring 14 heads of state) and the approach used in 1990 for the Goodwill Games. In both instances, private individuals and organizations led the bid and hosting effort, and called upon the City to provide security and other municipal services.

Despite the fact that the APEC heads of state meeting was scheduled only three months before the actual event, the ministerial meetings as well as the leaders' retreat on Blake Island were a success. The Goodwill Games were also successful. Thus, it seems reasonable that planners would utilize what they viewed as a tried-and-true approach: the private sector Seattle Host Organization (SHO) and federal agencies were responsible for the hosting aspects, while the City, working with other federal and local agencies, took responsibility for security.

The lack of coordination in this case may stem from some important differences in how the City and private sector organized themselves compared with APEC and the Goodwill Games.

When the planning effort for APEC began, the City formed a planning committee led by the head of the City of Seattle's Office of Intergovernmental Relations, Tom Tierney, which included state, city, and private sector representatives.¹ Once President Clinton announced the invitation of the heads of state, an APEC Host Committee was created, which included the Governor, King County Executive and Seattle Mayor, and 13 local business leaders. Tierney's committee, which included police and fire department representatives, served as an executive committee.

For the WTO planning effort, however, the current Director of the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, Cliff Traisman, was just a representative to the Seattle Host Organization's monthly planning meetings, as opposed to a leader of the meetings.

Traisman led a separate city WTO Coordinating Committee which included representatives of various departments, including SPD, but no members of the Seattle Host Organization. While Seattle Police Department planners were permitted to sit in on the monthly planning meetings of the SHO executive committee and subcommittee chairs, they were not given a 'place at the table.' One shortcoming of SHO's decision not to have a security subcommittee, as US Secret Service Special Agent in Charge Ron Legan reportedly highlighted in his after action interview with SPD planners, was that "key planning decisions were made in a vacuum devoid of input for public safety officials."

In the example of the Goodwill Games, the City of Seattle hired a full-time Goodwill Games coordinator to serve as a liaison between city departments and the Seattle Organizing Committee (SOC), and to negotiate contracts and agreements with the SOC. Furthermore, the Seattle Organizing Committee's structure included the equivalent of a security subcommittee, something which the WTO Seattle Host Committee refused to do. A consultant hired by the Seattle Host Committee to evaluate its planning effort in early September 1999 warned that this might be a shortcoming, stating, "The relationship of SHO to security should be pro-active. The need to manage possible demonstrators who may possibly disrupt the event is critical to SHO and its operations."²

A-2. The planning model failed because public and private sector planners did not develop a comprehensive, written plan uniting hosting, security, and constitutional rights considerations.

The failure to create a single, comprehensive written plan for the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial that integrated both private sector and public sector responsibilities was a key shortcoming of the organizing effort. Such a document would have contained, among other things, both the hosting and security strategy and directives.

The Seattle Host Organization's planning structure relied upon specialized subcommittees led by volunteer chairpersons, overseen by SHO's executive committee and executive director Ray Waldmann. The structure included subcommittees for fundraising, transportation, hospitality, facilities and equipment, accommodations, website and logo, accompanying persons programs, etc., but as mentioned above, specifically did not include a security committee.

Michael Pitts, the consultant hired by SHO to evaluate its state of readiness in early September 1999, highlighted some of the shortcomings of such a compartmentalized structure, "The current volunteer committee structure has advantages and disadvantages. Although this system is inexpensive and capable of addressing a wide variety of tasks, there are also operational drawbacks, including: lack of accountability, difficulties with multitask coordination, and absence of the "sense of urgency" required for the transition from planning to operations."³ Pitts was soon thereafter hired to oversee SHO's planning and operations, and promptly required all subcommittee chairs to produce written plans that would be united into a single, comprehensive hosting plan.

The WTO Public Safety Committee and the Seattle Police Department relied on a series of subcommittees that largely worked on their own. A complete, written plan unifying the subcommittees' efforts that people could have evaluated as a whole, in order to identify

gaps, was not produced until early November, at which point it may have been too late to make anything more than minor revisions.

City security planning was also compartmentalized. For example, building security, risk management, and emergency management were not included in any of the WTO Public Safety Committee planning efforts, nor in the city's official WTO Coordinating Committee led by the Office of Intergovernmental Relations.

The difficulties encountered in credentialing conference participants were a good example of the problems created by the failure to integrate private and public sector planning. Credentialing plans were wholly inadequate and resulted in widespread confusion and unnecessary security risks. This was a result of the fact that the State Department, the WTO, the Secret Service, and SPD had separate and conflicting credentialing schemes and, up until the month before the conference, it appears that no one was in charge of integrating these competing plans or ensuring that all delegates and staff received credentials.

A written, comprehensive plan, circulated and formally reviewed by private and public sector leaders, would have highlighted gaps such as credentialing, and perhaps overcome the inadequate coordination between private and public sector planning efforts. With strong executive leadership, such an approach perhaps would have forced resolution of funding issues as well.

A-3. Given that this event was as complex as past international events hosted in Seattle, not enough time was available to re-evaluate the plan and deploy adequate resources to address any changes.

Clearly, the WTO meetings changed a great deal from the time Seattle first became aware of the possibility of hosting them to the time that the delegates arrived. All of those involved confirm that even the WTO did not have a realistic idea in the beginning of the number of attendees, the controversy generated, or the logistical challenges that would be presented. Nonetheless, officials in the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, some of whom played similar roles during APEC, were well aware that "the [WTO] meetings would be a larger event than the 1993 APEC ministerial."⁴

The Seattle Police Department was placed in a difficult position. McCarthy & Associates, a team of law enforcement consultants hired by the mayor to conduct an independent review, concluded that "To prepare a complex multi-agency plan in such a brief period of time would have been extremely difficult." Nonetheless, SPD compounded the difficulties through its failure to dedicate full-time planning personnel and a functioning demonstration management subcommittee until mid-July.

One example of how time limitations may have affected SPD's ability to adapt to new information was the creation of the Flying Squad. In early November, SPD created a Flying Squad to monitor the periphery of marches and address any splinter groups involved in illegal activity, apparently in response to intelligence briefings on the likelihood of DAN and anarchist groups possibly using scheduled marches as screens. By the time the operations orders for this squad were given, the staffing shortages were well known and it is not clear where enough officers were found to staff the Flying Squad. It is also not clear what arrest and booking procedures the Flying Squad was to

follow or to what extent the Flying Squad and other arrest and booking operations were integrated, if at all.

A-4 The Seattle Host Organization and the City of Seattle Executive Office, in their eagerness to host the WTO at all costs, became advocates for the meeting instead of watching out for the city's interests.

Members of the Seattle Host Organization, including public officials, were preoccupied first with selling the City of Seattle to the WTO selection committee and then, after the selection of Seattle, with selling the merits of the WTO conference to the city. The mayor and officials from Seattle's Office of Intergovernmental Relations became advocates for the meetings, instead of watching after the public interest.

As one of SPD's lead planners commented, "The planning for this event was hampered by the lack of commitment from the elected officials who encouraged the bid committee to compete for hosting the WTO conference in Seattle. If elected officials 'want' something, they should ask and answer the question, 'how much and who will pay' prior to supporting the process to 'get' that thing."

Members of the mayor's cabinet and the Office of Intergovernmental Relations were involved in both the scramble to prepare for the visit of 14 unexpected heads of state for APEC, and the subsequent scramble to secure federal reimbursement for the \$1.2 million spent by the city on APEC security costs. The mayor himself was involved in the private sector Goodwill Games Seattle Organizing Committee, which signed a master agreement with the City of Seattle to protect taxpayers from footing the cost.

Yet, when Councilmember Choe requested that the City of Seattle sign memoranda of agreement laying out responsibilities for hosting and costs, the mayor's staff took no action. When asked by the panel for his reasons for not following through, Cliff Traisman, Director of the mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Relations, responded, "the reason we never acted on it was due more to the fact that that's the type of memorandum of understanding we would want prior to engaging in a bid."⁵ Though Traisman claimed that there was no bid process, he and his staff were intimately involved in the bid effort, including attending site selection meetings with WCIT, WTO and State Department representatives, as well as coordinating the production of a letter from the mayor supporting the bid effort.⁶

Finally, their eagerness to host the WTO at all costs seems to have led SHO members – including the mayor's office – to turn a blind eye to early warnings about the potential for protests, including concerns conveyed by WTO officials themselves. On November 12, 1998, Mayor Paul Schell and members of the Seattle Organizing Committee, a precursor of the Seattle Host Organization, met with the WTO site selection committee and were informed of the demonstrations and riots that occurred at the 1998 WTO meeting in Geneva,⁷ but appear to have paid little attention to these concerns.

B. Security Planning and Preparation

Every reviewer that has looked at the events of last fall, including the Seattle Police Department, agrees that the security planning was terribly inadequate. Numerous foreseeable problems were not addressed in the plans, such as inter- and intra-agency communications, transportation and other issues. Because of the numerous failures, the conference failed to proceed smoothly, and an inadequate security force struggled to keep up with the demonstrations at the expense of the constitutional rights of protestors and citizens.

B-1. The City of Seattle intelligence ordinance DID NOT materially affect the Seattle Police Department's ability to effectively identify and plan for possible protest activity.

In their After Action Report, the Seattle Police Department describes the impact on the intelligence gathering function of SPD by Seattle's investigation ordinance, which prohibits SPD from gathering intelligence on political or religious groups unless there is a threat of unlawful activity occurring within the City of Seattle and authorization is sought.

However, there were numerous indications that unlawful behavior, ranging from peaceful civil disobedience, to property damage, to violent acts, was a strong possibility. Abundant evidence of such activity was freely and publicly available, and in the possession of the planners, well before the WTO Ministerial. The problem was that Seattle Police Department commanders ignored the ample warnings they received on protest-related disruptions of the WTO Ministerial meetings.

The intelligence ordinance does not restrict SPD from accessing publicly available sources (e.g. newspapers, websites, television), and there is evidence that ample information was obtainable through these sources. During the planning period extensive information on protester plans and numbers was publicly available via newspapers and the internet many months before the conference. A list of some of the publicly available information is included in Appendix D. Furthermore, while Seattle's intelligence ordinance prevents SPD from gathering and retaining intelligence on political activities, it does not prevent SPD from hearing, reading or viewing information forwarded by other entities, including information available from FBI intelligence. Though they may not retain or distribute documents or tapes, the content *can* be shared verbally within the department.

Finally, in late September 1999, following widespread news coverage of the Ruckus Society Action Camp, SPD planners did receive an authorization to collect intelligence for the WTO conference. In early November, a briefing paper was circulated which "described, in detail, possible and probable criminal activities to be directed against the WTOC. Possible crimes included blocking city streets and sidewalks...property damage, banner hangings..."⁸ A week before the conference, SPD commanders had in hand "information relating to simultaneous marches meeting at the area of the Paramount Theater/Convention Center set for the am hours of 11/30," that would include anarchist affinity groups, and that the participants' goal was, "to prevent Clinton from speaking and WTO from meeting on 11/30." Information was also available that groups would have "particular agendas, e.g. lockdowns/blockades via tripods, police confrontations, possible occupation of sites etc."

With such detailed information in hand, it is clear – and inexplicable – that SPD commanders ignored the intelligence they received. No amount of modification to the intelligence ordinance would prevent such a failure to act.

B-2. The Seattle Police Department, despite the clear evidence that it would need assistance, was unwilling to guarantee payment for additional police resources from other agencies.

Throughout the planning process, the department evaluated other resources that were available, wrote to other police departments, talked to the National Guard, and then in almost every instance failed to ask for any additional assistance. According to the SPD After Action report, “the lack of an *outside* funding source (emphasis added) to reimburse mutual aid agencies influenced the decisions of the Incident Commander against requesting full-time planning and operational resources from allied agencies.” In his personal after action notes to Chief Stamper, one of SPD’s lead planners wrote, “Problems encountered in the planning and operation of the public safety support for the 1999 Seattle Ministerial flowed from the limitations imposed regarding budget.”

Though SPD did utilize motorcycle escort officers from several area police departments, including Kent, Bellevue and the King County Sheriff’s Office, it appears that use of these mutual aid resources was predicated on not having to reimburse those agencies. On September 15th, Tacoma Police Chief James Hairston withdrew the backup support of the Tacoma Police Motorcycle Officers due to SPD’s inability to guarantee reimbursement.⁹

Due to budget constraints, SPD also failed to allocate adequate personnel and resources to arrest processing. As described above, SPD had adequate warning that numerous protesters were planning to engage in civil disobedience and that many hoped to enact mass arrests. Yet, throughout the planning process, staffing levels for arrest processing were repeatedly cut when staffing shortfalls occurred in other, more critical areas such as demonstration management and venue security. In fact, by November 5th, the arrest processing teams were reduced to a total of 18 personnel split between the two locations and two watches.¹⁰ Even if all arrestees were cooperative, it is difficult to imagine how such a small number of people (4-5 officers at any location at any given time) could enact the 600-700 ‘symbolic’ arrests that were part of SPD’s operational plan.¹¹

Protesters not only expressed a desire to enact mass arrests, but explicitly warned SPD commanders on November 28th that if police could not make the desired 500 – 1500 mass arrests, then protesters would have to “find some way to get arrested.”¹² To the panel, it is incomprehensible why, at this point, SPD would not have called up as many mutual aid resources as needed.

In an interview with the panel, Assistant Chief Joiner stated that the cuts to the prisoner processing teams and demonstration management platoons “wasn’t driven by money, that was driven by how many officers we physically had available to put into service...we never did make any cuts of staffing tied to budgetary issues.” However, he later stated, “if we ended up having to utilize officers from other agencies I was certainly concerned

that they be compensated for that...It should come out of the pockets of the agency that's requesting the assistance."

In a third example, the King County Sheriff's Office offered, in writing, an additional 114 trained Civil Response Team members to SPD, which turned down the offer. While the Sheriff's Office did not make this offer contingent upon funding, according to King County staff, the executive branch surely would have requested funding from Seattle.

The panel maintains that once it became clear there were simply not enough personnel available, budget limitations prevented SPD from pre-staging mutual aid resources.

B-3. Security planners planned more extensively for extreme terrorist activity, such as detonation of a weapon of mass destruction, than for the more likely and predictable mass civil disobedience and disturbances.

While some post-event reviews have stated that the city was unprepared for the worst case scenario, we disagree. The city prepared extensively for the worst case scenario in terms of nuclear devices, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, etc., and in this instance, followed the cardinal rule of disaster planning, "Plan for the worst and hope for the best."

In contrast, planning for the more likely civil disturbances surely did not follow this cardinal rule. Assistant Chief Joiner relied heavily on past successes in negotiating with protest group representatives and failed to develop contingency plans. In fact, in terms of civil disturbances, the city was only prepared for the best case scenario: fewer than 250 protestors doing civil disobedience and union marchers quickly marching down Fourth Avenue and then back down Fifth Avenue without the slightest deviation.

In her interview with the panel, protest organizer Sally Soriano expressed surprise about the number of demonstrators who turned out on the morning of Nov. 30, and other protest leaders also said that the crowds exceeded their expectations. While it is obviously difficult to predict crowd size for an unusual event such as this one, there were many indications that a big crowd was coming to demonstrate, and that a substantial portion of that crowd would engage in civil disobedience.

Civil disobedience aside, the locations of designated demonstration areas were not clearly marked and their sizes were inadequate. Given the thousands of people expected, there were simply too many people to fit within the designated areas, or even on city sidewalks. It is also surprising that planners would expect a protest as large as the planned labor march to proceed through downtown without some of the participants leaving the march to join other demonstrations. Finally, planners were well aware that anarchist groups from Eugene and elsewhere were traveling to Seattle. As one interviewee pointed out, the point of anarchism is not to play by the rules.

B-4. The failure to plan adequately led to the exposure of individuals exercising their constitutional rights and of bystanders to the effects of chemical agents, including "tear gas," and the denial of the constitutional rights of all citizens within the emergency curfew areas.

The Panel agrees with Recommendation P-7 of the SPD After Action Report, which states in part, “all planning should be centered upon a progression of escalating contingencies, or tiers of potential response.”¹³ The panel has found no evidence of written, much less operationalized, plans that detail incremental steps to take to handle increasing numbers of protesters. Instead, the plan appears to have jumped from calling up mutual aid assistance from the King County Sheriff’s Office and Washington State Patrol to declaring a state of emergency.

Ironically, one of the planning scenarios developed by SPD staff and circulated to watch commanders by Assistant Chief Ed Joiner addressed a ‘worst case scenario’ that was chillingly similar to the events that transpired on the afternoon of November 30th, 1999. The written scenario progresses to the worst case scenario in which “Demonstration Management Team is now fully committed to one large event. Other incidents throughout the downtown area continue to multiply. SPOC receives numerous reports of scattered looting, fights and small fires throughout the downtown area.”¹⁴ Yet ARC staff have found no evidence of written contingency plans to deal with such a scenario.

While the department created and trained (to some extent) five demonstration management platoons, there was no plan for deploying those platoons in response to the widely-publicized plans for civil disobedience on the morning of Nov. 30. Nor did there seem to be any plans at all to deal with the groups that had promised to “shut down the WTO.” In fact, it appears that the only plan was to use chemical agents to disperse the crowds, as evidenced by Assistant Chief Joiner’s meetings with individual councilmembers a few days before the event, in which he warned that chemical agents were a distinct possibility.¹⁵

B-5. The public safety plan failed to adequately address clearly foreseeable management, logistics and communications problems.

The planning process failed to deal with communications, transportation and other issues. As a result those systems failed during the conference, leaving security forces unable to communicate or transport arrestees. Security forces also suffered from an entirely avoidable lack of food and water.

The plans that the Seattle Police Department had developed were adequate for dealing with a small number of protestors and the permitted marches. When the problem grew larger than that, the plans proved deficient in multiple areas – there were no extra batteries for the radios, no transport for demonstrators who were arrested, an inadequate command staff, and no plan whatsoever for dealing with nighttime demonstrations.

While there was a plan to call for mutual aid in the event of large demonstrations, there was no thought given to food, housing or liaisons for those officers. Nor was there any provision for breaks or back-up for Seattle Police Officers required to stay on duty longer than anticipated.

B-6. All members of the WTO Public Safety Executive Committee share responsibility for the plan because they reviewed the plan and did not raise strong enough nor formal objections.

Representatives from the King County Sheriff's Office have told WTO ARC staff that prior to the WTO Conference they took the initiative to meet with SPD Assistant Chief Ed Joiner and personally raise their concerns about whether SPD had adequate resources to deal with the threatened demonstrations. However, Assistant Chief Joiner, in an interview with a separate WTO ARC panel, denies that any other agency ever raised any concerns with him directly. WTO ARC staff are unaware of any written documentation of such communications. As responsible public safety officials who have sworn an oath to serve and protect, the other members of the Public Safety Executive Committee – King County Sheriff's Office Assistant Chief Jackson Beard, Washington State Patrol Chief Annette Sandberg, Seattle Fire Department Chief James Sewell, Federal Bureau of Investigations Agent-in-charge Charles Mandigo, and US Secret Service Special Agent Ron Legan – had a responsibility to push harder to address the shortcomings of what was a joint plan, beginning by putting their concerns in writing and directing them to the agency head, Chief Stamper.

B-7. In failing to plan adequately for mass arrests, SPD violated its prior understanding with protest groups to conduct scripted mass arrests.

Large numbers of protestors expected to be arrested for civil disobedience during the WTO meetings. Prior to the WTO Ministerial, SPD, Seattle Mayor's Office and city council representatives held several meetings with the leaders of various protest groups, including representatives from the Ruckus Society and Direct Action Network. At these meetings, according to one participant, some protest group representatives stated that they would be engaging in civil disobedience, and SPD warned that anyone who broke the law would be "picked up and carried away," as had been done for the demonstrations at the South African embassy in the early 1990s.¹⁶

The Seattle Police Department and other officials had allowed individuals planning to demonstrate to believe that they would be arrested, but failed to have any plan for carrying out those arrests. In an interview with the panel, Assistant Chief Joiner confirmed that doing 600-700 'symbolic' arrests in which protesters would be arrested in batches of 10 at a time without any passive resistance, was part of the operational plan that had been developed in negotiations with protest group representatives. On Oct. 31st, the sergeant responsible for arrest planning was asked to be sure he had enough supplies for 600 arrests.

In hindsight, it is unclear how or if SPD intended to carry out mass arrests. As McCarthy & Associates noted in the report commissioned by Mayor Paul Schell, neither the WTO Public Safety Committee's Operational Guide nor the Operational Plan included written plans for mass arrests. In fact, staff were unable to uncover more than a smattering of SPD documents describing the arrest and booking process and responsibilities.¹⁷ Furthermore, SPD repeatedly cut the staffing levels for arrest processing throughout the planning process. In fact, by continuing to negotiate with protest groups when there were clearly not enough staff to follow through with mass arrests, nor plans to call on mutual aid resources, SPD may have negotiated in bad faith.

Decisions not to engage in mass arrests at the last minute were not communicated to the demonstrators. On Sunday night (November 28th) Ruckus Society representatives met with SPD representatives to express their desire to have 500-1,500 civil disobedience arrests on Tuesday November 30th, to which the demonstration management commander was unable to commit. Finally, late on Monday night SPD stated that they would not in fact be able to accommodate mass arrests to one protest group representative, but there appears to have been no effort made to warn other groups that SPD was unable to uphold its part of the mass arrests.

B-8. SPD was aware that the Sandpoint facility was inadequate for detaining arrestees and failed to act.

Sergeant Guy Pratt was SPD's lead for arrest planning. In mid-October, Sgt. Guy Pratt met with Department of Construction and Land Use (DCLU) staff to apply for a temporary use permit and Occupancy Certificate for the Brig at Sandpoint. Among the requirements was a condition that the maximum number of persons being processed at one time not exceed 200 people, and the installation of a CPCV pipe to run water from a nearby fire hydrant to the facility. Around the same time, an intergovernmental work group composed of municipal and county judges, prosecutors and Department of Adult Detention staff raised concerns that were relayed directly to Chief Joiner about how the Brig would be used, what arrangements would be made for medical screening, transportation of injured arrestees, and telephone access for arrestees held more than four hours.¹⁸ Finally, a week before the conference was to begin, SPD and WSP arrest planners toured the facility to finalize logistics plans.¹⁹

Yet, when SPD Captain Debbie Allen was belatedly deployed to the Sandpoint facility on the afternoon of December 1, 1999, she found that "the facility had only two (?) (sic) telephones, hardly functional bathrooms, undrinkable water, and unsecured access...other supplies, such as paper sacks and envelopes (sic) for prisoner property and protective gloves for officers were also running low."²⁰ Between the 'prisoners' waiting in buses to be processed and those already inside, there were only approximately 250 individuals, far less than the 600 arrestees for which Pratt had been told to prepare.²¹ With so much written and visual warning of the condition of the facility and necessary preparations, it is hard to understand how and why SPD failed to act. The answer may lie partly in the decision made by SPD planners to assign a sergeant, who would not have command authority, to oversee such a critical task, and perhaps partly in a conscious decision to de-emphasize making arrests in favor of other means of crowd dispersal.

B-9. The department made no effort to develop comprehensive demonstration management training with other law enforcement agencies.

The panel concurs with the conclusion of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Washington, that "the conduct of officers and police command decisions made in response to WTO protests indicate a lack of adequate training."

Except in the areas of dignitary escorts, bomb squads and situational assessment teams, there was no attempt to train together with officers from other agencies in the region, particularly for demonstration management. Either because the planning

process was too disorganized, or because the department officials continually downplayed the likelihood of relying on any other agencies, there was no opportunity for serious joint training in crowd management. In his interview with the panel, Assistant Chief Joiner explained that they had only done integrated training with units that they anticipated would work together, such as dignitary escorts, bomb squads, and situational assessment teams.

Part of the reason that the Seattle Police Department had not done any training with other agencies was that it did not call them until its own officers were overwhelmed on Tuesday morning. But there were officers from some agencies (those that had made them available at no cost), and it clearly would have been advantageous to do joint training with them, and with Washington State Patrol and others who had a defined role in providing security for the conference. This may, again, have been because planners were concentrating on keeping costs down, rather than focussing on the security problems they faced.

C. Agency and Organizational Failures

The planning for the conference failed because some of the organizations involved did a poor job on their part of the organizing process or completely failed to adhere to their responsibility to represent the interests of their constituents.

C-1. The Seattle Police Department

C-1a. Police chief Norm Stamper abdicated his responsibilities in hosting the WTO Ministerial.

The police chief is primarily responsible for public safety given that he is the chief security officer in the City of Seattle. The security duty the Chief owes to the citizens of Seattle cannot be delegated, not to the assistant chief nor to any public safety committee.

According to FBI representatives as well as Washington State Patrol Chief Annette Sandberg, another member of the WTO Public Safety Executive Committee, Chief Stamper attended only the first meeting of the executive committee, then delegated his participation on both the general WTO Public Safety Committee and the executive committee to Assistant Chief Joiner. McCarthy and Associates also concluded that “Chief Norman Stamper was virtually absent from any role of leadership or direction related to the preparation and planning for the World Trade Organization Conference.”

The tried-and-true model of public safety planning used for the WTO Ministerial – a public safety executive committee and a broader general committee that does the majority of the planning – is predicated on having the most senior individual from each agency on the executive committee. Having an assistant chief both serve as lead planner AND have oversight responsibility removes this essential check and balance against normal human error. As McCarthy and Associates stated, “delegation...in no way reduced the Chief’s responsibility to provide direction, control and oversight of the planning effort.”

In the eyes of the panel, the error in Stamper’s decision to delegate all responsibility for the WTO Ministerial to an assistant chief extends beyond the failure to provide direction, control and oversight. When asked by the panel whether anyone had considered not providing security services in the absence of adequate funding, Assistant Chief Joiner responded, “Well, I’m an Assistant Chief, or was an Assistant Chief of the Seattle Police Department. I certainly don’t have the authority to tell the elected officials we’re not going to do something.” The agency head is also responsible for asking hard questions and taking hard stands with elected officials. The chief’s duty is to negotiate for best interests of the agency and the public in a way that a subordinate cannot.

An excellent example of this duty is the action taken by former Seattle Police Chief Patrick Fitzsimons during the Goodwill Games planning process: when the Seattle Organizing Committee and the City of Seattle failed to provide funding for public safety planning, Fitzsimons persuaded the multi-agency security planning group to threaten to cease all public safety involvement.

C-1b. While the mayor and the police chief are clearly responsible for overseeing an event of this type, Assistant Chief Ed Joiner's planning failures contributed significantly to the overall failure of the planning process.

Assistant Chief Joiner's failure to assess the magnitude of the challenge facing the department and his failure to urge the chief and the mayor to make more resources available kept them from dealing with the dilemma facing the city. Joiner's insistence that the problems facing the city could be solved by an ongoing dialogue with protest groups encouraged the mayor and the chief in their belief that planning was actually proceeding at an appropriate level.

His own officers were the most immediate victims of those failures, which ensured that the department would be overwhelmed on Nov. 30

C-2. The Seattle Host Organization's greatest failure was in not raising adequate funds for the conference.

The Seattle Host Organization and its parent organization, the Washington Council on International Trade, initially promised that it would contribute \$1.5 million toward security costs for the event. However, as its own problems grew, and fund raising lagged, the Seattle Host Organization began to retreat from that commitment. In the end, it paid only a small fraction of the total, clearly treating the city as the least important of its creditors.

The entity responsible for securing the invitation and planning the WTO Ministerial, the Seattle Host Organization, was essentially a private-public partnership. As a private-public partnership, the panel believes that the public still owns the partnership. If the project goes awry the public will shoulder most of the blame and the cost.

The lack of a signed Memorandum of Understanding laying out responsibilities and financial commitments between the City, the Seattle Host Organization and federal agencies – similar to the Master Agreement signed by the City and Goodwill Games Seattle Organizing Committee -- allowed the Seattle Host Organization to duck financial responsibility for the event's outcome.

C-3. City of Seattle Executive

There are clear financial and other incentives to the city to host conventions. In this case there was talk of the conference generating \$11 million for retailers, hotels and restaurants, not to mention an additional total revenue increase at \$622,160 to state government and \$246,000 to local government. There were also valuable trade and international business contacts at stake.

C-3a. Seattle Mayor Paul Schell should have taken an active leadership role in the decision-making and coordination of staff overseeing the event.

Clearly, the mayor's office had the opportunity, early in 1999, to insist on memoranda of understanding with the federal agencies and with the Seattle Host Organization – which

might have eliminated many of the problems subsequently encountered. Had the mayor adequately represented the citizens of Seattle, he would have required that there be an agreement with the Host Organization including a financial guaranty that would have ensured that the citizens would not be left stuck with the bill, as did Mayor Charles Royer for the Goodwill Games. In fact, Councilmember Martha Choe recommended that such an agreement be created, but the mayor's office failed to follow through on the councilmember's request.

The mayor's office either was, or should have been, aware of the growing challenges posed by the WTO Ministerial, and it should be the mayor's office that is the most vigorous defender of the city's position. But instead of protesting when the Seattle Host Organization said it couldn't pay the promised \$1.5 million, the mayor's office was silent. The mayor failed to work with the council on dealing with the looming budget problems and made no attempt to challenge the Police Department's inadequate plan.

Representative Jim McDermott called Mayor Schell relaying the White House's concerns that the failure of the Seattle Host Organization to have raised even a quarter of the necessary funds was hurting the chances of the City winning federal security funds. Schell's initial response was to point out that he wasn't responsible for raising the host organization's funds. In a follow up letter, McDermott appealed to Schell, as one of the co-Chairs of the Seattle Host Organization, to provide his "help and leadership in Seattle and within the SHO."²²

C-3b. Mayor Schell was clearly aware of the potential for disruptions.

While the Panel has received little documentation of information exchanges between SPD and Mayor Paul Schell, there is a wealth of evidence that the mayor's representatives had ample information about the potential protests. Key among the mayor's designees were: Deputy Mayor Maud Daudon, Special Assistant Walt Hubbard, Special Assistant Laurie Brown, Cliff Traisman (Director of the Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Relations), and Keith Orton (International Specialist in the Mayor's Office of Intergovernmental Relations).

Instances in which the mayor's office was clearly aware of the potential for disruption and which suggest interpretations of the information include:

- *November 12, 1998* – Mayor Paul Schell and members of the Seattle Organizing Committee, a precursor of the Seattle Host Organization, meet with the WTO site selection committee and are informed of the demonstrations and riots that occurred at the 1998 WTO meeting in Geneva.²³
- *May 14, 1999* – Through his weekly report to the mayor, Cliff Traisman advises the mayor's office that "it is becoming less likely that heads of state, other than President Clinton, will attend the Seattle WTO. Since heads of state drive the security costs up exponentially, this is good news for the City and the Seattle Police Department."²⁴
- *September 13, 1999* – Keith Orton e-mails copy of a London Sunday Times article (9/12/99) to individuals affiliated with the SHO which states, "Militant groups, including Reclaim the Streets and Earth First!, which coordinated the June 18 (J18) action, have been in contact with their American counterparts to launch a

simultaneous campaign on November 30th... Seattle Police have been liaising with the American Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to prepare for the 10,000 activists expected, many of them travelling from Britain, Germany and the Netherlands.” One of the organizers attended the Arlington, Washington direct action training camp.²⁵

- *October 12, 1999* – In a memo to city employees, Mayor Schell characterizes the WTO media coverage as “tending to whip up worst-case scenarios about the WTO.”²⁶
- *November 9, 1999* – Walt Hubbard (Special Assistant to the Mayor) faxes protest group materials to SPD Captain Brent Wingstrand. The cover memo states, “Laurie Brown (Mayor’s Office – Labor) pulled this from the website and wanted to ensure you knew about the November 30th 7:00 AM event (Mass Non-Violent Direct Action).”²⁷ The materials invite protesters to meet at 7:00 AM at Seattle Central Community College and Victor Steinbrueck Park at 7:00 AM on November 30th before “non-violently and creatively block[ing] them [the WTO] from meeting.”
- *November 28, 1999* – SPD Intelligence representatives personally brief Mayor Paul Schell and Deputy Mayor Maud Daudon on protester tactics.

C-3c. The Executive sought only to inform the city council and not to engage them.

Seattle Mayor Paul Schell and his staff did not work frankly with the city council on planning and budget issues raised by the WTO. Instead, the mayor’s office seems to have concentrated on minimizing the potential problems, and focussing council briefings on the positive aspects of the upcoming event. Whether because of fear of public criticism, or because the mayor’s office wasn’t paying close attention to the issues, there was very little effort to involve City Council members in reviewing the likely costs and sources of reimbursement for the project.

In lieu of working directly with the city council, the mayor relied on representatives of the police department to brief council members on why they felt that security planning was under control, and on Cliff Traisman, from the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, to brief councilmembers on the expectations of federal reimbursement.

The Office of Intergovernmental Relations created a Local Advisory Committee which was formed to “create a dialogue with members of the Seattle City Council, King County Council, Washington State Legislature and Washington State Consular Corps regarding the WTO Ministerial in Seattle.” This, and sporadic council briefings, were the ways in which the executive branch sought to involve council. Instead of bringing meaningful issues to this group, such as the thorny issue of how best to fund security costs, OIR Director Cliff Traisman suggested the group focus on giving feedback to SHO committees “central to the WTO planning effort” such as the Education and Outreach Committee and the Media Committee.²⁸

Perhaps Mayor Schell’s reluctance to fully involve the city council stems from an earlier experience. During the planning process for the Goodwill Games, despite having promised to fund all public safety costs, the Seattle Organizing Committee refused to

fund or even negotiate funding any Fire Department costs, claiming they were unnecessary. In return, the city council voted unanimously to withhold nine temporary-use permits that the SOC would need for venues in Seattle until SOC agreed to pay for the fire services.

Then-Port Commissioner and SOC board member Paul Schell was quoted in the Seattle Times as saying, "I don't like having a shotgun pointed at our heads at this date, so I find [the Council's action] disappointing," claiming that the host committee's budget was tight and additional funds were not available to cover the cost.²⁹

C-3d. Seattle Mayor Paul Schell was less than forthright to business and retail owners about both the potential for large demonstrations and the amount of revenue that the Ministerial was expected to generate for businesses.

In speeches and press releases, the mayor continually promoted the idea that the conference would be a boost to downtown businesses and to downtown retailers. Yet, during the APEC conference, many retailers lost business as shoppers avoided the traffic problems created by so many motorcades.

In his letter to Seattle business owners dated October 29, 1999, Mayor Schell advised the businesses of the two permitted marches to date, the Jubilee 2000 procession and the AFL-CIO march, then later commented, "However, there are sure to be last minute developments with a significant impact on traffic that cannot be specifically planned for or announced in advance. These include...unauthorized demonstrations or activities that may be staged to draw attention to points-of-view different from those of the WTO."³⁰

In his letter to City of Seattle employees, the mayor wrote, "While all the media 'buzz' is tending to whip up worst-case scenarios about the WTO, this event is a momentous, exciting affair for Seattle. It speaks to the growing stature of Seattle's place on the world stage, and shows impressive confidence in our ability to serve as gracious and competent hosts for international dialogues."³¹ This seems particularly misleading given the information on potential disturbances available to the mayor's office at that time, as described above.

C-3e. Personnel in the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, the city department most responsible for the overall organizing effort, seem to have concentrated on serving as boosters for the conference rather than as public servants looking out for the welfare of the citizens of Seattle.

Individuals from the City of Seattle's Office of Intergovernmental Relations (OIR) worked with the Seattle Host Organization, the Seattle Mayor's Office, and the Seattle Police Department on all phases of the planning.

When asked by the panel for his reasons for not following through on Councilmember Choe's request for a memorandum of understanding with the Seattle Host Organization, Cliff Traisman responded, "the reason we never acted on it was due more to the fact that that's the type of memorandum of understanding we would want prior to engaging in a bid."³² He went on to explain that by then, they were 60 days into the planning and

already moving forward with organizing the city's interagency coordination committee, a committee that was principally concerned with a series of booster-type issues like downtown visitor improvements, cleaning and beautification, public information and outreach, aggressive panhandling and related issues, related activities and venues, and cultural events. Traisman decided to create a booster-type interagency coordination committee, as opposed to an oversight committee uniting private sector hosting responsibilities with public safety and other municipal responsibilities, as did his predecessor for APEC.

There is no indication that Traisman considered asking the Seattle Host Organization for a contract or any sort of documentation of its commitment to pay for security costs. There is no indication that he considered asking for more funds from the Seattle Host Organization as the estimated security costs grew. Nor does he report ever objecting as the Host Organization suggested that the likelihood of paying the full \$1.5 million was diminishing.

It is also not clear how Traisman thought funds received from the Seattle Host Organization would be applied. He has stated that he consistently said those funds would be distributed among the jurisdictions providing security for the conference, but the video tape of the March 29 city council briefing includes a statement from him implying that those funds would be applied only to Seattle's security costs.

C-4. The Seattle City Council should have insisted on greater involvement and fiscal oversight.

It appears that all councilmembers were not equally involved in oversight of the city's preparations for the WTO ministerial, especially as an entity. Though Councilmembers Sue Donaldson and Martha Choe were invited to pre-bid meetings with the Seattle Host Committee and WTO Site Selection Team, there is little evidence that Donaldson and Choe sought to inform the full council or introduce legislation supporting the effort. The city council had as much responsibility as the mayor's office to adhere to the city's Goodwill Games Coordinator's suggestion for future events that the mayor and council approve "a resolution indicating the need for the City to be informed of and to agree with any proposal by a third party...to produce a major event in Seattle. The resolution should clearly state the need for City concurrence prior to (sic) the submission of a bid."³³

While Councilmember Choe asked the Office of Intergovernmental Relations to establish an Memorandum of Understanding with SHO and the federal government, there was no follow-up by OIR or by Councilmember Choe.

While the city council was not adequately briefed, or involved in the planning process, councilmembers appear to have allowed themselves to be lulled into thinking that planning (and efforts to obtain reimbursement) were proceeding smoothly. Individual councilmembers did raise concerns at various times, but they did not follow through, and require real and detailed responses to the issues that they raised.

In contrast, the city council was involved in and controlled the planning for the Goodwill Games to a much greater extent. For the Goodwill Games, the city council passed numerous ordinances relating to the planning effort, including appropriating additional

funding to the Seattle Police Department to cover planning expenses in 1989 and 1990. As mentioned earlier, the council's unanimous decision to withhold temporary use permits forced the Seattle Organizing Committee to fund fire and emergency medical services required for the event. At the time, five councilmembers, including Councilmember Sue Donaldson, were reportedly "willing to force the cancellation of events if that is the only way to get payment."³⁴ Given Donaldson's involvement in the Goodwill Games, it is hard to understand why she did not press for a similar master agreement for WTO.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

This report finds that the city was unprepared to host the WTO and that planning for the event was insufficient. We recommend several changes in the process to ensure that similar failures do not occur in the future.

1. The city council should adopt an ordinance stipulating that any large event requiring a significant commitment of city resources be approved by the city council. Approval may be granted following a review that includes a cost/benefit analysis and an opportunity to comment from independent experts, city leaders and departments, and the public. This ordinance would establish the template for evaluating future events.

In the case of large events, the review process should include an independent analysis of the fiscal impact to the City, not just the hard costs of police and fire, but the management costs associated with the event.

2. In the case of events with a private sponsor, there should be assurances that the taxpayers of the city are protected from unplanned costs. That protection could take the form of a contract with the private sponsor, or a requirement for a bond or some other financial guarantee.

3. The City must develop a new planning model, which includes a comprehensive oversight structure that has a clear delineation and hierarchy of responsibilities. This new model must have stronger coordination between security planning and host planning. The new model must also incorporate security planning that allows for the changing nature of events and establish a system of incremental contingencies in response to those events.

4. This committee does not recommend repealing or changing the City of Seattle Intelligence Ordinance. We do, however, recommend that the new planning model for intelligence gathering use an approach that makes the most of available resources under the ordinance.

5. The mayor should meet with the chiefs of the various security forces making up the mutual aid network 120 and 60 days out from the event, in order to make sure preparations are on schedule. If all key members of the mutual aid network cannot guarantee 60 days before that the planning and training have been integrated and are on schedule, then serious remedies need to be required to resolve those deficiencies.

6. Protection of constitutional rights of demonstrators must receive the same emphasis as other topics in SPD training courses. Constitutional rights (civil liberties) concerns should be addressed like other security issues. The planning model for a controversial event should assume mass civil disobedience and plan and train accordingly. Tactics of protestors should be planned for and respected.

TERMS AND ACRONYMS

APEC:	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARC:	Accountability Review Committee
MOU:	Memorandum of Understanding. The main use of the term in this report concerns document which the Seattle Host Organization negotiated with various federal agencies to determine who would be responsible for handling what, and who would pay what.
SHO:	Seattle Host Organization
SOC:	Seattle Organizing Committee (created to organize the 1990 Goodwill Games)
SPD:	Seattle Police Department
WTO:	World Trade Organization
WTOC:	World Trade Organization Conference; 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference held in Seattle.

APPENDICES

- A. Summary of Seattle City Council Resolution 30100 Establishing the WTO Accountability Review .
- B. WTO Panel #2 Membership Biographical Information
- C. Background Information on the Goodwill Games and Asian Pacific Economic Coordination Conference
- D. Information on Potential Protests Available to the Seattle Police Department
- E. Planning Goals and “Matrix”

Appendix A. Panel's Area of Focus

Seattle City Council Resolution 30100 established a special committee to review events surrounding the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle. The committee in turn established three citizen panels of five or more members whose responsibilities were as follows:

“Panelists will collaborate with staff in the inquiry. Panels will receive background information and briefings that will give them a grounding in documentary evidence in possession of the committee. They will confer among themselves about the direction, adequacy, and balance of the review. Each panel will hold at least seven (7) two-hour meetings, and may participate in interviewing subjects of the review. Transcripts will be made of these interviews, and the tapes will also be part of the public record.”

“After gathering all possible information, each panel will be expected to draft a report, that states, on the basis of documentary and testimonial evidence, the best factual understanding of the issues raised in that panel's charge. It may highlight factual findings it finds particularly important to understanding the events of the WTO. The ARC will review each of the panel reports for thoroughness and balance, and forward them to the Council for legislative action. ARC will submit its own findings of recommendations for legislation or changes in city policy.”

The area of focus of this panel was outlined in Resolution 30100 as follows:

“The Preparations and Planning Panel will examine all information gathering, consultation, and planning that preceded the WTO Ministerial. It will establish what threat assessments, warnings, evaluations, and other information, including press reports, documentaries, and accounts of similar previous gatherings, were provided the officials who conducted city planning, and the decisions they based on that information. It will examine the nature of agreements or understandings reached with potential demonstrators about the protection of the rights to assembly and free speech and the conduct of protests.

The panel will work to determine the following:

1. Identities of all city employees, state and federal employees, members of the Seattle community, and others, who participated in the WTO Planning.
2. The dates, place, participants, and duration of all planning meetings.
3. The mechanisms by which they assembled information, conferred, and deliberated.
4. The information on which persons involved based their planning, including documents or briefings by FBI, ATF, Secret Service, foreign governments, and any state or county law enforcement agencies. The extent to which information from undercover agents was received from any source.
5. The ways and extent that other similar national or international gatherings were examined for security preparations, including other WTO, NATO, APEC meetings, major sports gatherings such as Olympic and Goodwill Games, and US political conventions.

6. The details of all initial, intermediate, and final plans that were prepared, together with identities of persons who prepared, examined, edited, altered, or approved such plans.
 7. The feedback, rejection, or acceptance of city plans by state, county, or federal officials, consultants, or others involved.
 8. The dates and details of all "table exercises" that were conducted, the names of participants, and the results of those exercises.
 9. Details of all contingency plans for civil emergency, including plans to use riot control methods and equipment, such as tear gas, pepper gas, or other technologies, plans to utilize other law enforcement agencies, federal troops or police, plans to declare curfews or close areas of the city, and plans to deploy, house, feed, and otherwise support special personnel.
 10. Preparation, stockpiling, and amounts of riot control equipment for contingency use.
 11. Financial and resource planning that detailed the costs of plans and contingencies.
 12. The extent to which policy, training, staffing levels, and supervision helped or prevented law enforcement personnel in protecting the public or maintaining an environment in which peaceful protest could occur.
 13. Contacts and communications with the SHO (Seattle Host Organization), community groups, and elected officials concerning legal or fiscal responsibility for the WTO meeting. Details of all proposals that might have imposed conditions or responsibilities on the SHO or WTO, and the outcome of such proposals.
 14. Contacts or negotiations with county, state, or federal officials, including Members of Congress, about subsidizing the security costs of the meetings, and the results of such contacts or negotiations.
 15. Decisions about the need for training of police, and what training was conducted for any officials, police, or others who would be involved, including police or law enforcement agencies outside Seattle who provided personnel under mutual aid agreements.
 16. The nature and extent of briefings given all city officials, including the city council, about planning by the Executive, SHO, or others in the Seattle Community
 17. The nature and extent of all meetings and negotiations with groups planning to protest, including organized labor, environmental, and others.
 18. The nature and extent of advance agreements with such groups about their conduct while demonstrating, and the strategic decisions by city officials. based on those agreements.
 19. The number and affiliation of the protestors who were expected.
 20. The final plan for parade route, off-limit areas, delegate areas, delegate protection, delegate movement, and protection of venues. Plans, if any, for operations on Capitol Hill.
- Additional areas of inquiry may be addressed with agreement from ARC."

Appendix B. Biographical Information on the Panel Members

Kay Godefroy

South East Crime Council

Norma Kelsey

President, Office & Professional Employees International Union Local #8;
President, King County Union Retirees Council;
Executive Board Trustee, King County Labor Council
Member, Mothers for Police Accountability
Member, Michael Ealy Social Justice Foundation

Dr. Carl Livingston

Carl Livingston is the lead professor in the Political Science Department at Seattle Central Community College. He has been an adjunct Business Law professor at Seattle Pacific University's School of Business. He was an active member of Mayor Rice's Reconciliation Project and is the author of a scholarly article entitled Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action and the Case for its Retention which the Howard Law Journal published in Fall of 1996.

Clark Pickett

Architectural designer and community activist in the Pike/Pine Neighborhood;
Chair, Pike/Pine Neighborhood Planning Committee;
Board Member, Northwest Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning in Italy;
Longtime involvement in urban design issues in Seattle.

Sister Kathleen Pruitt

Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace

Angela Toussaint

Angela Toussaint is the Executive Director of The Civic Foundation. Ms. Toussaint has 15 years of training, organizational development consulting, management and non-profit organization experience and holds a B.A. in organizational development and public policy. She has been a community leader for the last decade and resides in Rainier Valley. Currently, Ms. Toussaint serves as Vice Chair of the King County Civil Rights Commission.

Beth Wojcik

President, Seafair

Appendix C. Background Information on Goodwill Games and APEC Conference

APEC – November 14-19, 1993

Bid Process

The Washington Council on International Trade, headed at that time by Robert Kapp, led the effort to host the 1993 APEC Ministerial meeting in Seattle. The State Department awarded the meeting to Seattle in late 1992, giving planners roughly one year to prepare. The meeting was initially slated to be a ministerial-level meeting, involving 750 delegates and several hundred members of the press.

Three months before the meeting, President Clinton invited the heads of state of the 15 member nations to attend a leaders' summit immediately following the ministerial meeting, dramatically increasing the scope and complexity of the planning effort. For example, the number of the press swelled to 3,000. The ministerial meetings were held in Seattle; the APEC leaders meeting was held on Blake Island.

Conference Planning

Initially, the planning effort was overseen by a planning committee formed by the head of the City of Seattle's Office of Governmental Relations, Tom Tierney, which included state, city (including police and fire), Chamber of Commerce and WCIT representatives.³⁵ The Washington Council on International Trade was responsible for organizing keynote dinners and receptions, non-governmental business seminars, spouse and leisure activities and other hosting events, as well as overseeing media relations. The US Government was responsible for "the conduct of the sessions and the handling of the official guests."³⁶

Once Clinton announced the invitation of the heads of state, an APEC Host Committee was created, which included the Governor, King County Executive and Seattle Mayor, 13 local business leaders, as well as two ambassadors and the director of the Port of Seattle. The City's coordinating committee served as the executive committee. The host committee was chaired by Dean Thornton of Boeing; Ray Waldmann served as the chief of staff.

Funding

Three weeks before the meeting, the APEC Host Committee announced that it had raised less than half of the \$500,000 to \$800,000 it had targeted for the event.³⁷ Less than a month before the event, City officials estimated the conference would cost the City \$1.6 million, \$1.2 million of which would be Seattle police costs. King County donated police help. City tax revenues from the conference were estimated at \$76,000. At that time, the City still did not know how it would cover its costs.³⁸

Security

The Secret Service took responsibility for the security of the heads of state while the State Department was responsible for the safety of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Commerce and the US Trade Representative. The Seattle Police Department was responsible for traffic management, security outside the hotels, motorcycle escorts for motorcades, and crowd management. Several protests were held; the largest gathered 500-600 demonstrators at Westlake Park.

Goodwill Games – July/August 1990

Bid Process

To some extent, the City's participation in the bid effort was brought to the full city council for a vote. Bob Walsh led the quest to hold the Goodwill Games in Seattle. In 1986, sent a letter to then-Mayor Charles Royer and Councilmember Jane Noland, stating that a non-profit corporation would be created to "submit the bid, negotiate the contract, and meet all host community responsibilities." In contrast to the WTO Ministerial, this non-profit organization would "contract with the City of Seattle for specific public services such as police and fire protection" and would "be fully responsible for the financial risks." He then requested the City contribute \$12,500 towards the cost of organizing and submitting a bid³⁹.

The city council then unanimously passed an ordinance authorizing funding this effort on May 5th.

Following the Games, the City's Goodwill Games Coordinator recommended for future events that the mayor and council approve "a resolution indicating the need for the City to be informed of and to agree with any proposal by a third party...to produce a major event in Seattle. The resolution should clearly state the need for City concurrence prior to (sic) the submission of a bid."⁴⁰

The private sector expressed concern about the lack of strategic reviews of the then-numerous efforts to host special events in Seattle. Following Ted Turner's announcement that Seattle would host the games, the Chamber of Commerce wrote to Bob Walsh and expressing concerns about the funding for hosting such events and the financial impacts to the private sector of the bidding effort. The Chair of the Board of the Convention and Visitor's Bureau then forwarded the letter to Mayor Royer, with a suggestion that a separate board, with membership from the private sector, city, county, port and state, be created to conduct a strategic review of the economic impacts and potential costs to the community of all proposals.

Event Planning

There were 15 athletic venues across the state; it was clearly not a Seattle-only event. Planners had 4 years to prepare for the event. The City of Seattle hired a full-time Goodwill Games coordinator to serve as a liaison between city departments and the Seattle Organizing Committee, and to negotiate contracts and agreements with the SOC.

The Seattle Organizing Committee included a security committee, led by former sheriff Vern Thomas.

The city council passed numerous ordinances relating to the planning effort, including appropriating additional funding to the Seattle Police Department to cover planning expenses in 1989 and 1990.

Funding

The overall budget for the event was greater than \$70 million dollars, all of which the Seattle Organizing Committee was responsible for raising. The State legislature

contributed several million dollars, which was overseen by the state Department of Community Development.

The City of Seattle required the Seattle Organizing Committee to sign a formal Master Agreement approved by the city council which outlined financial responsibilities, and to provide a guaranty to ensure the City received its funds. In July 1989, the City of Seattle and the Seattle Organizing Committee entered into a Master Agreement which outlined the extent of the city's contribution to this effort. The City would suffer no financial loss as a result of the games, would expend only as much funds as would be gained through tax receipts (\$1,165,00) and funding from the State legislature, and would accommodate the events without any reduction of service to the citizens of Seattle. The City's guarantee included a lien on the Seattle Organizing Committee's ticket revenues.

The city council's refusal to issue temporary-use permits ensured that Fire Department costs were covered. In September 1989, the Seattle Organizing Committee informed the city that it would not fund or even negotiate funding any Fire Department costs.⁴¹ Negotiations were unsuccessful, despite an obvious need for fire and emergency medical services. Finally, on June 25th, 1990, the city council voted unanimously to withhold nine temporary-use permits that the SOC would need for venues in Seattle until SOC agreed to pay for the fire services. At the time, five councilmembers were reportedly "willing to force the cancellation of events if that is the only way to get payment."⁴²

Paul Schell, then a port commissioner and an SOC board member, was quoted in the Seattle Times as saying, "I don't like having a shotgun pointed at our heads at this date, so I find [the Council's action] disappointing," and that the host committees budget was tight and additional funds were not available to cover the cost.⁴³

Security

Seattle Police Chief Patrick Fitzsimons led the "Law Enforcement Council," a multi-agency planning group comprised of federal, state and local officials. Lieutenant Clark Kimerer was SPD's lead planner.

In September 1988, Chief Fitzsimons and the Law Enforcement Council threatened to disband unless the Seattle Organizing Committee guaranteed funding for the security planning effort. Mayor Royer then asked the Seattle Organizing Committee to work with city officials to negotiate a planning budget.⁴⁴

Appendix D. Information on Potential Protests Available to the Seattle Police Department

Examples of the more than adequate warnings received by SPD include:

- *February 1999* -- At the first meeting of the Public Safety Executive Committee, which SPD Chief Norm Stamper and Assistant Chief Ed Joiner attended, the FBI presented information on the riots that occurred at the 1998 WTO meeting and 50th anniversary celebration of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the WTO's precursor. SPD apparently discounted this information based on cultural differences between Europe and Seattle. However, King County Sheriff's Office commanders took the information quite seriously and began doing additional research. On February 16, three weeks after the selection of Seattle as the site for the Ministerial, an officer in the King County Sheriff's Office sent a memo to Sheriff Reichert describing the demonstrations and raising concerns:
"An estimated 10,000 demonstrators, representing a wide variety of viewpoints and causes, appeared on each of several days during the conference. This fact is particularly noteworthy because the people of Switzerland are noted for their reserve, orderly behavior, and tradition of non-participation in such events."
"Reasonable speculation is that we will experience some protests and/or demonstrations...Even a peaceful and orderly conference would tax local law enforcement resources. Dealing with 10,000 plus demonstrators in the core area of Seattle would be a significant challenge."⁴⁵
And, later that spring SPD included a summary of the information provided by the FBI in an information packet sent to participants in the various planning subcommittees.
- *May 1999* -- Seattle Host Organization (SHO) representatives traveled to Geneva to meet with WTO officials and were given two tapes of a French [or possibly Swiss] TV show about the 1998 riots. Upon their return, according to SHO Director Ray Waldmann, a copy of the videotape was given to SPD.⁴⁶ The video was subsequently purged from SPD files for reasons related to the Intelligence Ordinance, although SPD later (Oct. 1999) obtained an analysis of the tape in English that had been prepared for the State Department.⁴⁷
- *May 1999* -- An e-mail exchange between King Co. Sheriff's Office commanders indicated that SPD was at this point already aware that WTO protest organizers might amass as many as 10,000-50,000 demonstrators.⁴⁸
- *July 1999* -- The FBI's first Threat Assessment stated, "At this time, the FBI possesses no credible information that suggests violence or significant property damage should be expected to accompany these demonstrations."⁴⁹
- *September 1999* - Following widespread news coverage of the Ruckus Society Action Camp, SPD's Criminal Intelligence Section seeks and receives an authorization to collect intelligence for the WTO conference.
- *November 9, 1999* -- the Intelligence Subcommittee presented a briefing paper which "described, in detail, possible and probable criminal activities to be directed against

the WTOC. Possible crimes included blocking city streets and sidewalks...property damage, banner hangings..."⁵⁰

- *November 12, 1999* – SPD Intelligence personnel brief WTO Incident Command staff on information gathered to date.
- *November 17, 1999* – FBI disseminates a Threat Update which underlines “strong potential for significant protest activity...violent or destructive acts of civil disturbance must be considered a distinct possibility.”⁵¹ The FBI was aware that groups from Eugene planned to come to Seattle, and warned, “protest groups from other areas and those local to Eugene who have associated with Art & Revolution in the past are known to adhere to violent philosophies, essentially believing that any type of action, including acts of violence that could cause injuries, is appropriate to further their objectives.”⁵²
- *November 23, 1999* -- A second briefing paper was disseminated which contained “information relating to simultaneous marches meeting at the area of the Paramount Theater/Convention Center set for the am hours of 11/30,” that would include anarchist affinity groups, and that the participants’ goal was, “to prevent Clinton from speaking and WTO from meeting on 11/30. Groups will have particular agendas, e.g. lockdowns/blockades via tripods, police confrontations with possible occupation o sites etc.” By this time, SPD was also aware that the ‘assault’ was likely to be “pie-shaped”, i.e. that groups would converge from all directions towards a single point.⁵³

Appendix E. Planning Goals and “Matrix”

Planning Goals

The Panel began its analysis by discussing what they believe the goals of the organizers should have been to ensure an ‘ideal’ event. The goals (and associated sub-goals) selected by the panel were:

1. Public safety is ensured
 - There are no fatalities and/or grievous injuries.
 - There are no minor injuries
2. Protection against property damage.
 - There is no major property damage
 - There is no minor property damage
3. Rights of citizens to demonstrate and protest are protected
 - Security of demonstrators is ensured
4. Unlawful protesters are quickly detained
5. Conference proceeds.
 - Delegates can access all conference locations
6. Security of delegates is ensured.
7. Disruptions to daily life are minimized.
 - Civil society functions
 - A sense of safety is promoted.
 - Downtown stores and businesses remain open
8. City officials, particularly SPD, had appropriate plans for which they were properly trained and adequately staffed.
9. The event is fully funded and fiscally responsible. [“Fiscally responsible” means that a reasonable budget is developed and a reasonable effort is made to stay within it.]

Developing The Matrix

To focus their discussions and organize the volumes of information on different aspects of planning for this event, the panel developed a matrix that organized information on the planning process by goal area. The complete matrix is appended to this report. WTO ARC staff were asked to collect, summarize and footnote information corresponding to four questions for each goal:

- What indications did planners have, or should have reasonably had, about threats to each goal?
- What evidence exists of plans (written or otherwise) supporting this goal?

- What resources were allocated (and when) based on that information?
- To what extent was this goal fulfilled during the week of November 28-December 3, 1999?

At each meeting the panel discussed the information gathered by staff at each meeting corresponding to the designated goal area, drew conclusions and/or directed staff to gather any additional information.

¹ Thornton, Dean and Ray Waldmann, "Seattle has good reason to be proud of APEC," *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 12/7/93.

² Pitts, Michael J., 9/24/99, Memorandum to Seattle Host Organization ("SHO"), "Operational Assessment."

³ Pitts, Michael J., 9/24/99, Memorandum to Seattle Host Organization ("SHO"), "Operational Assessment."

⁴ Traisman, Clifford, undated memorandum to Mayor Paul Schell, "OIR Weekly Report August 1 – August 7."

⁵ Traisman, Clifford, 6/26/2000, interview with WTO ARC Planning and Preparations Panel (Panel Two).

⁶ Traisman, Clifford, undated memorandum to Mayor Paul Schell, "OIR Weekly Report August 1 – August 7."

⁷ Paxton, Kathy, 4/19/00, Interview with Alec Fisk (WTO ARC Staff Director).

⁸ Anonymous, undated, "General Recap of 11/9 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS," received by WTO ARC staff 5/30/00 with other SPD intelligence materials.

⁹ Hairston, James, 9/15/99, Letter to Brent Wingstrand (Seattle Police Department).

¹⁰ Caldwell, Cynthia, 11/5/99, E-mail to Steve Paulsen, "Demo Man. Staffing – Pris. Proc."

¹¹ Joiner, Ed, Interview with WTO ARC Planning and Preparations Panel.

¹² Pugel, Jim, 1/5/99, "World Trade Organization Demonstration Management Draft After Action Report."

¹³ Seattle Police Department After Action Report, p. 52.

¹⁴ "Overload", undated, unsigned, accompanied by a note from Ed Joiner to Operations Bureau Commanders, "Scenarios and Intelligence Information." In an interview with the panel, Assistant Chief Joiner confirmed that this was a scenario prepared by Sgt. Grant Tietje which, along with several other scenarios, Asst. Chief Joiner circulated in early November.

¹⁵ Panel interview with Deputy Mayor Maud Daudon, 6/20/00.

¹⁶ Staff interview with Councilmember Nick Licata, 4/26/00.

¹⁷ In contrast, Washington State Patrol planners, who anticipated mass arrests stemming from possible freeway blockages, produced detailed plans for their personnel.

¹⁸ Fewel, Joe, WTO Planning Unit, 10/19/99, Memo to A/C Ed Joiner, Operations Bureau (SPD), "Inter-Governmental Planning for WTO Meeting."

¹⁹ Reichert, Rob (Washington State Patrol), 12/13/99, Memo to Lt. Dough Thoet, "After Action Report – WTO."

²⁰ Allen, Debbie, 1/10/99, Memorandum to Captain Brent Wingstrand, "WTO After-Action Report."

²¹ Caldwell, Cynthia, 10/31/99, E-mail to Guy Pratt, "PPT Check-up."

²² McDermott, Jim, 11/10/99, Letter to Seattle Mayor Paul Schell.

²³ Paxton, Kathy, 4/19/00, Interview with Alec Fisk (WTO ARC Staff Director).

²⁴ Traisman, Clifford. Undated Memorandum to Mayor Paul Schell, "OIR Weekly Report/May10-14."

²⁵ London Times, 9/12/99, "Clashing in the City: violence at the 'carnival against capitalism' in June left 46 people hurt and caused L&2m of damage" (e-mailed by Keith Orton to various individuals, including Samk@seattlechamber.com, tlaggner@wcit.org, pfelts@ustr.gov)

²⁶ Schell, Paul, 10/12/99, Open letter to City of Seattle Employees.

²⁷ Hubbard, Walt, 11/9/99, fax to Brent Wingstrand (9 pp.)

²⁸ Traisman, Clifford and Keith Orton, 5/21/99, Memorandum to Council President Sue Donaldson, "City Council participation in the WTO planning process."

²⁹ "City Leans on Games to Pay: Council Wants Assurance on Fire, Medical Services," *The Seattle Times*, 6/26/90.

³⁰ Schell, Paul, Mayor of Seattle, 10/29/99, Letter to "Seattle Business Owners."

³¹ Schell, Paul, Mayor of Seattle, 10/12/99, Letter to "City of Seattle Employees."

³² Traisman, Clifford, 6/26/2000, interview with WTO ARC Planning and Preparations Panel (Panel Two).

³³ Moseley, David, 9/4/90, Memorandum to Andrew Lofton and Mayor Norm Rice, "Goodwill Games Coordinator Final Report." Attachments: "Goodwill Games Final Report" (5 pp.)

³⁴ "City Leans on Games to Pay: Council Wants Assurance on Fire, Medical Services," *The Seattle Times*, 6/26/90.

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- ³⁵ Thornton, Dean and Ray Waldmann, "Seattle has good reason to be proud of APEC," *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 12/7/93.
- ³⁶ Washington Council on International Trade, undated, "Background Notes on APEC and the 1993 Seattle APEC Meetings."
- ³⁷ "APEC Committee's fund-raising effort lags," *The Seattle Times*, 10/23/93
- ³⁸ "APEC to be \$5.3 million boost to city," *The Seattle Times*, 10/20/93.
- ³⁹ Walsh, Bob, 4/14/86, Letter to Mayor Charles Royer and Councilmember Jane Noland.
- ⁴⁰ Moseley, David, 9/4/90, Memorandum to Andrew Lofton and Mayor Norm Rice, "Goodwill Games Coordinator Final Report." Attachments: "Goodwill Games Final Report" (5 pp.)
- ⁴¹ Moseley, David, 9/4/90, Memorandum to Andrew Lofton and Mayor Norm Rice, "Goodwill Games Coordinator Final Report." Attachments: "Goodwill Games Final Report" (5 pp.)
- ⁴² "City Leans on Games to Pay: Council Wants Assurance on Fire, Medical Services," *The Seattle Times*, 6/26/90.
- ⁴³ "City Leans on Games to Pay: Council Wants Assurance on Fire, Medical Services," *The Seattle Times*, 6/26/90.
- ⁴⁴ "Royer Initiates Talks to Resolve Impasse Over Games' Security," *The Seattle Times*, 9/2/1288.
- ⁴⁵ Beard, Jackson, 2/16/99, memo to Reichert, Dave, et al., "World Trade Organization Biannual Ministerial Conference".
- ⁴⁶ Waldmann, Ray, 3/6/00, Interview with Alec Fiskien and Kirsten Evans (WTO ARC Staff).
- ⁴⁷ Grossman, Kevin, 3/20/00, Note to Sean Sheehan (Law Department) included on a facsimile cover sheet, transmitting an "Analysis of French-language Video Tape" prepared by Robert E. Shillenn for the State Department IO/OICA Division.
- ⁴⁸ Griffin, Ron, 5/14/99, E-mail to Larry Mayes, Jon McCracken, Dave Reichert and Denise Pentony, "CRT Supplemental Budget."
- ⁴⁹ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 7/7/99, "Threat Assessment: Biannual Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization, Seattle Washington." (Previously distributed to the panel)
- ⁵⁰ Anonymous, undated, "General Recap of 11/9 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS," received by WTO ARC staff 5/30/00 with other SPD intelligence materials.
- ⁵¹ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting, Seattle Washington." (Previously distributed to the panel)
- ⁵² Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting."
- ⁵³ Anonymous (Seattle Police Dept.), "Recap of 11/23 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS."

Panel 2 – Preparations & Planning
Planning Goals Matrix Prototype
DRAFT 7/6/00

This matrix is a tool that panel members used to organize the voluminous material related to the WTO Ministerial planning process. The information listed for each goal does not reflect the complete set of information available.

Goals/Objectives	What indications did planners have, or should have reasonably had, about threats to each goal?	Evidence of planning/plans	What resources were allocated (and when) based on that information?	To what extent was this goal fulfilled during the week of November 28-December 3?
<p>1. Public safety is ensured.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are no fatalities and/or grievous injuries There are no minor injuries <p>Key Documents</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> July 7 FBI Threat Assessment Nov. 17 FBI Threat Update Public Safety Committee Operations Guide, Appendices S and T SFD After Action Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7/7/99 – First FBI Threat Assessment states, “The FBI possesses no information indicating a terrorist threat to the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle....At this time, the FBI possesses no credible information that suggests violence or significant property damage should be expected to accompany these demonstrations.”¹ 11/17/99 – Nov. FBI Threat Update states that “there is a strong potential for significant protest activity...violent or destructive acts of civil disturbance must be considered a distinct possibility.”² <p>➤ <i>Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7/7/99 – July FBI Threat Assessment states, “Threats of chemical or biological assault could represent the most likely terrorist scenario directed at high-profile events such as the WTO Ministerial Meeting, and would be consistent with a recent nationwide increase in the number of hoaxes involving threatened use of weapons of mass destruction.”³ 10/21/99 – The Seattle Times reports that while officials emphasize that no threats of biological or chemical attack have been received, they are making preparations for the possibility of such an attack.⁴ 11/17/99 – Nov. FBI Threat Update states, “The FBI possesses no information indicating a specific threat to the WTO meeting emanating from either domestic or international 	<p>The Public Safety Committee's operations planning included two relevant subcommittees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Explosive Ordinance Disposal/Hazardous Materials/ Weapons of Mass Destruction: included reps from SPD, SFD, Port of Seattle, KCSO, WSP, US Postal Service, ATF and FBI. Fire/Emergency Medical Services: included reps from SFD and Tukwila Fire Dept. ¹¹ <p>➤ <i>Explosives/Weapons of Mass Destruction (Chemical, Biological, Nuclear)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SFD was the lead agency for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) planning but collaborated closely with SPD bomb response and SWAT teams. Planning focused chiefly on explosives, chemical weapons and biological weapons, and less on nuclear devices. SWAT teams: The intended mission included providing a tactical response to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction incidents. The SPD team was to be augmented with at least 10 former SWAT members. They were to begin training full-time by 9/1/99. ¹² The Operations Plan included obtaining additional SWAT teams from WSP, KCSO, and the Valley Emergency Response Team as well as FBI hostage negotiators. SPD was to provide radios to WSP to ensure their ability to communicate with SPD. As of 11/9/99 a means to ensure radio communication with the FBI was not established. The SWAT teams were to be deployed in vehicles to minimize response times.¹³ Normally, SPD provides first response for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bomb Response: There were to be 6 K-9 teams (4 from ATF, 1 Port of Seattle, 1 WSP) located at hotels and venues to detect possible devices. SPD's Bomb Response team was augmented with WSP, FBI and ATF personnel to establish 8 teams. 11/4/99 – FBI held TableTop training exercises which included situation training for attacks by air, hostage barricade, civil disturbance, large vehicle explosions and nuclear devices. <p><i>Delegate/Dignitary Protection</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SFD's Operational Plan included a dignitary protection division, consisting of additional paramedics, fire/HazMat rescue and command staff at venues. 10/5/99 - SPD, SFD and local hotels jointly create plans for evacuating venues if necessary.¹⁶ The intended mission of SPD's SWAT team included having primary responsibility for hostage-taking. <p><i>Fire/Emergency Services</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2/99 – 11/99 - Seattle Fire Department serves as lead agency coordinating with the FBI, Secret Service, and various local and national fire and disaster-preparedness agencies to prepare for possible explosive, chemical, nuclear, or biological terrorist attacks. The training and preparation is extensive. 10/9/99 - Harborview Medical Center and the Seattle Fire Department, who are jointly overseeing all emergency operations, host a meeting with local hospitals and medical centers to “discuss the plans for hospital readiness during WTO.”¹⁷ 	<p>➤ Despite dozens of bomb threats - on December 1, for example, there were 12 separate threat incidents (as reported in the Seattle Fire Department After-Action Report) - there were no terrorist attacks involving explosives, biological weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction.</p> <p>➤ In some cases, paramedics were trapped in venues or unable to get to areas where there was a medical emergency, and SPD was either unable to reach them through the crowds or was not in the area. According to the SFD After-Action Report, “security was not assured for SFD on responses...protestors surrounded fire units and delayed their movement.”²⁴</p> <p>➤ Out of the tens of thousands of people involved in the WTO protests, a total of 92 were seen at area hospitals and medical centers for WTO-related medical needs from November 27 through December 3: 73 protesters, 10 delegates, and 9 law enforcement officers. All but 6 were treated and released; those six (three law enforcement officers, three others) were admitted for further treatment. Four of these admissions were for preexisting medical conditions, two for injuries. ²⁵</p> <p>➤ There were no fatalities or major injuries. The most serious injury reliably reported was a broken hand suffered by a law enforcement officer. ²⁶</p> <p>➤ On November 28, the FBI advised the various law enforcement agencies involved in WTO that email and cell phone transmissions were likely being intercepted, and that sensitive</p>

	<p>terrorists.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/24/99 -- Letter from Deputy Fire Chief A.D. Vickery to Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Director of Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, National Security Council expressing concern that NSC does not view the terrorist threat in the same light as the Fire Department. Indicates that both protesters and delegates could be targeted.⁵ <p>➤ <i>Threat of Terrorism Against Delegates</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/17/99 - FBI Threat Update states, “The FBI has not identified a specific security risk emanating from, or directed at, any countries participating in the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle; however, several participants may pose special security concerns relative to the event.” The Threat Assessment highlights the following countries: China, Cuba, Greece, Taiwan, and Turkey.”⁶ <p>➤ <i>Threat of Violence</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10/5/99 – SFD security update details recent terrorist and protest activity around the world and states that “there are numerous domestic and international groups whose political agenda could be served through the disruption of the Conference.” It also describes plans by the Ruckus Society, the Direct Action Network, and People’s Global Action to shut down the WTO.⁷ • 11/17/99 - FBI Threat Update, “Protest groups from other areas and those local to Eugene who have associated with Art & Revolution in the past are known to adhere to violent philosophies, essentially believing that any type of action, including acts of violence that could cause injuries, is appropriate to further their objectives.”⁸ • 11/9/99 - <i>Seattle Post-Intelligencer</i> article, “Hospitals on alert for an 	<p>explosives, in collaboration with SFD. Were a device to detonate, the FBI would have assumed command and control. ¹⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HazMat: SFD was the lead for HazMat and Weapons of Mass Destruction responses in conjunction with the FBI. ¹⁵ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10/11/99 - In a memo to Seattle Fire Department Chief James Sewell, Deputy Chief A.D. Vickery says that “we have to be prepared to address life safety issues for the protestors as well as our personnel.”¹⁸ • 11/9/99 - <i>Seattle Post-Intelligencer</i> article, “Hospitals on alert for an attack by chemical weapons”, describes the efforts of local medical centers to prepare for possible chemical or biological terrorist attacks during WTO. Preparations include increasing staff, stockpiling medications and establishing or upgrading decontamination centers.¹⁹ • 11/9/99 – The SFD Operational Plan’s mission was to “minimize the loss of life and property resulting from fire, medical emergencies, and other disasters.” SFD’s preparations included augmenting existing resources with support from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local agencies: Seattle Public Utilities, King County Mutual Aid Agreements, Harborview Medical Ctr. and other local hospitals, Seattle-King Co. Public Health, and others. • State agencies: Fire Assets via the State Fire Mobilization Plan and ambulances from the WA State Military Dept. • Federal agencies: Public Health, FEMA, FBI, USSS, EPA, Dept. of Defense, ATF.²⁰ <p>➤ <i>Officer/Firefighter Safety</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An Emergency Medical Information card printed on bright yellow paper was developed for optional use as an officer safety measure. ²¹ <p>➤ <i>Delegate security</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Starting with the establishment of the Public Safety Committee on March 11, 1999, much of SPD’s preparations are geared towards venue and delegate security. • 11/3/99 - Operation Guide, Annex C through O, lays out venue security plans in great detail. • 5/14/99 - SFD, Medic One and various local medical agencies develop a plan for providing dignitaries and delegates with medical services, including delegate 	<p>information should be sent by alternate methods.²⁷</p> <p>➤ The Resource Management Center did not have an SPD scanning radio. ²⁸</p>
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	<p>attack by chemical weapons", quotes a hospital official as stating that "bioterrorism is a concern, but the greater likelihood of disaster has to do with riots or injury resulting from protests".⁹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11/16/99 - Memo from Assistant Chief Ramsey of the Seattle Fire Department to others in the department states that "crowds [are] estimated to be as high as 50,000...high emotions and infiltration of radical group members may create an explosive atmosphere that could ignite into civil disorder...the possibility of mob-type action does exist and we must consider and prepare for all hazards."¹⁰ 		<p>identification cards, a dedicated medical hotline, global pricing, and mini-clinics at the Convention Center.²²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Venues within Seattle's jurisdiction had a Capt. or Lt. assigned, with operational responsibilities for events occurring inside the venue and outside to the curb line. Access and security to the primary venues to require, outer perimeter (staffed by law enforcement), middle perimeter (staffed by private contract security and SHO: check id & list for permission to enter, includes magnetometer, augmented by SPD if needed), inner perimeter (SHO, WTO personnel determine who can enter meeting rooms.)²³ 	
<p>2. Property damage is prevented.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no major property damage. There is no minor property damage. 	<p>➤ <i>Previous WTO meeting featured riots</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11/98 – Visiting WTO officials describe the 1998 riots to the Seattle bid committee, including SPD and mayor's office representatives.²⁹ 5/99 – SHO representatives travel to Geneva and are given two copies of a video of a French TV show about the riots at the 1998 WTO meeting. Upon their return, a copy is given to SPD.³⁰ 6/18/99 – Rioting occurs in London, New York and Eugene, OR, stemming from the "J18" protests against a G-7 meeting in Cologne <p>➤ <i>Protester plans likely to disrupt normal activities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4/23/99 – <i>Wall Street Journal</i> reports that the steelworkers hope to mobilize 50,000 people to protest labor disparities.³¹ 5/13/99 – King Co. Sheriff's Office Capt. Ron Griffin meets with SPD representatives, who inform him that their intelligence indicates that WTO protest organizers may amass as many as 10,000-50,000 demonstrators.³² 9/2/99, <i>Seattle Weekly's</i> Geov Parrish reports that anarchists responsible for riots in Eugene, OR on June 18th plan 	<p>➤ <i>Police planning</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11/9/99 Public Safety Committee Operations Plan states that the Demonstration Management Plan Mission includes insuring "the safety of all conference attendees and citizens of the affected regions during the Conference."³⁷ 11/03/99 SPD planned to allocate 230 officers among 4 Demonstration Management Platoons. Platoon A (45 people) was to be the initial contact platoon, chiefly responsible for monitoring scheduled demonstrations, assisting with traffic control, assisting with perimeter security, and providing a visible deterrent to criminal activity. Platoon B and C were to handle crisis management, with Platoon B as backup to Platoon A, while Platoon C was to be a mobile force responsible for demonstrations away from WSCC and Paramount Theater. Platoons D & E were to be on standby, in Class A uniforms. SPD did plan to include a "Flying Squad" of 10-25 officers assigned to "prevent, deter, monitor, intervene and make arrests" in response to unlawful behavior "that may also be a by-product of this conference."³⁸ 	<p>➤ <i>Courts cancel jury trials</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8/9/99 - Ed Joiner writes to Judge Helen Halpert, Seattle Municipal Court, warning her that traffic impacts from the WTO may create problems for jurors in reaching the courts and requesting that the amount of time spent in court by police employees be eliminated or minimized to allow them to attend to WTO-related duties. Similar letters also sent to Mark Sidran and Norm Maleng.³⁹ 10/8/99 <i>Seattle Times</i> reports that King Co. judges cancel jury trials during WTO week because of concerns about prospective jurors not being able to reach trials.⁴⁰ 11/99, SPD WOC Fact Sheet states, Law enforcement will cooperate with peaceful demonstrators and resolve acts of civil disobedience in a timely and safe matter. Anyone engaging in criminal conduct will face arrest and removal from the scene.⁴¹ <p>➤ <i>Communication with Businesses</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10/29/99 Mayor Schell sends a letter to Seattle Business Owners, warning of traffic impacts, street closures and limitations on on-street parking.⁴² Traffic bulletins 	➤

	<p>to travel to Seattle to protest the WTO.³³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9/30/99 <i>Seattle Weekly's</i> Geov Parrish reports that labor activist are behind schedule mobilizing potential demonstrators and that march and rally plans are being scaled back. • 11/9/99 Workers and Students for Walkout Network (WASFAWN) website state, "The Mass Direction Action by DAN participants will be to physically stop the WTO from convening on the morning of November 30th....all [tactics] are intended to shut down the downtown area in order to stop business as usual for one day."³⁴ • 11/17/99 FBI Threat Update, "The FBI assesses the threat of terrorism and violent protest activity directed at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle as low to medium."³⁵ • 11/17/99 FBI Threat Update, "Protest groups from other areas and those local to Eugene who have associated with Art & Revolution in the past are known to adhere to violent philosophies, essentially believing that any type of action, including acts of violence that could cause injuries, is appropriate to further their objectives."³⁶ 			
<p>3. Rights of citizens to demonstrate and protest are protected.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of demonstrators is ensured. 	<p>➤ <i>Protester training, plans</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9/15/99 - Ruckus Society begins its weeklong activist training camp, Globalize This! Courses, reported in the <i>P-I</i> and <i>Times</i>, include "How to reconnoiter areas for protests, how to blockade objects and streets," and "creating mass civil disturbances."⁴³ • 11/1/99 - <i>Seattle P-I</i> runs article entitles "Ruckus Society getting set to disrupt WTO conference" that describes the Ruckus Society's training activities and protest plans. • 11/06/99 - <i>Seattle P-I</i> reports on student and labor plans for a city-wide walkout, "the better to clog up the area around the Convention Center." Article says "Labor is the key to a 	<p>➤ <i>Designated protest areas</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/3/99 - Operation Guide lists designated demonstration areas for all major venues. • The City routinely requires that organizers obtain a special events permit for marches and rallies occurring in public spaces (e.g. parks & streets). 	<p>➤ <i>Designated protest areas</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/5/99 – SPD maps designating permanent and temporary protest areas are created. • 11/05/99 City plans to close streets around Convention Center for security from 11/28-12/3; employees of business that will remain open undergo criminal background checks.⁴⁴ <p>➤ <i>Protest permits & negotiations</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Date unknown; probably just prior to 10/29 - Email from Richard Belshay to Cindy Caldwell and James Pugel describes how SPD has been working with the AFL-CIO to set up an identification system for marchers and eliminate the possibility of contraband being carried by marchers. 	<p>➤ <i>Designated protest areas</i></p> <p>➤ Eyewitnesses report that the designated protest areas are not demarcated.</p> <p>➤</p> <p>➤ Declaration of zone</p> <p>➤ Incidents in which lawful protesters were harmed</p>

	<p>successful walk out.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/24/99 Ruckus allegedly makes statement about shutting down the WTO at Mayor's press conference • 11/29/99 - SPD After-Action Report (p. 35) describes protesters overheard saying “Wait until tomorrow” and “Save it for Tuesday”. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10/29/99 – OIR, SPD and the mayor's office begin holding “protester briefings”.⁴⁵ • 11/9/99 - Parks Department and Seattle Police Department issue permits for AFL-CIO labor march and other scheduled protests, from this date through the WTO week itself. • SPD officers provided training to Jubilee 2000 marshals.⁴⁶ • SPD After-Action Report describes several marches being given police escorts (p. 34,39-40, 45) <p>➤ <i>City works with People's Gala organizers</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In an April 2000 interview, Assistant to the Mayor Laurie Brown states that the city worked closely with the organizers of this event to minimize the possibility of trouble. <p>➤ <i>Housing for protesters</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/1/99 - Seattle City Council adopts Resolution 30068, requesting that the Mayor “actively seek solutions for accommodating visitors arriving for the Ministerial”. • 11/2/99 - <i>Seattle P-I</i> article, “City is asked to help house WTO protesters”, discusses the attempts of Public Citizen to get the City Council to provide several thousand protesters with free housing during WTO week. • 11/11/99 - Letter from Paul Schell to Washington Council of Churches informing them that “the city...cannot legally provide lodging or accommodations for visitors” and requesting their help in “taking any steps possible to temporarily expand lodging and housing options...during the week of the WTO.” 	
<p>4. Lawbreakers are quickly detained</p> <p>Key Documents (<i>as there appear to be no written operations plans for arrests, we have listed several short documents</i>)</p>	<p>➤ <i>Previous WTO meeting featured riots</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/98 – Visiting WTO officials describe the 1998 riots to the Seattle bid committee, including SPD and mayor's office representatives.⁴⁷ • 5/99 – SHO representatives travel to Geneva and are given two copies of a video of a French TV show about the riots at the 1998 WTO meeting. Upon their return, a copy is given to SPD.⁴⁸ • 6/18/99 – Rioting occurs in London, 	<p>➤ <i>Arrest planning ‘players’</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD: Sgt. Guy Pratt lead, Capt. Cynthia Caldwell supervised. • WSP: Sgt. Rob Reichert, lead • WTO Intergovernmental Workgroup (led by Judge Helen Halpert & included Seattle Municipal Court, King Co. District Court, City Atty's office, SPD, KCSO) • KCSO: Sgt. Kevin Fagerstrom • King Co. Dept. of Adult Detention (DAD) 	<p>According to the SPD After Action report (p. 64), SPD plans apparently included having “Arrest/Booking Teams, also known as “Field Prisoner Processing Teams.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Field Prisoner Processing Teams were to take custody of prisoners brought to them by field officers. • The Sandpoint Prisoner Processing Team was to pre-book the prisoners. • WTO ARC staff have not received any other documentation of the roles and 	<p>➤ <i>Arrests during WTO week.:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrests by date⁶⁷: Nov. 29 – 2 Nov. 30 – 51 Dec. 1 -- ~500 Dec. 2 – 4 Dec. 3 – 3 • Arrests by type (according to WSP)⁶⁸: Misdemeanor – 556 (Majority charged with Disorderly Conduct or Failure to Disperse)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General Recap of 11/9 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS" • SPD After Action Report, p. 64-65 • WTO Operations Order for the "Flying Squad" • Sgt. Rob Reichert (WSP) After Action Report of • Capt. Debbie Allen (SPD) After Action Report 	<p>New York and Eugene, OR, stemming from the "J18" protests against a G-7 meeting in Cologne</p> <p>➤ <u>Likelihood of Unlawful Conduct</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7/7/99 – First FBI Threat Assessment states, "The FBI possesses no information indicating a terrorist threat to the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle....At this time, the FBI possesses no credible information that suggests violence or significant property damage should be expected to accompany these demonstrations."⁴⁹ • 11/9/99 – SPD's Criminal Intelligence Section presented a briefing paper which "described, in detail, possible and probable criminal activities to be directed against the WTOC. Possible crimes included blocking city streets and sidewalks...property damage, banner hangings..."⁵⁰ • 11/17/99 – Second FBI Threat Update states that "there is a strong potential for significant protest activity...violent or destructive acts of civil disturbance must be considered a distinct possibility."⁵¹ • 9/2/99 - <i>Seattle Weekly's</i> Geov Parrish reports that anarchists responsible for riots in Eugene, OR on June 18th plan to travel to Seattle to protest the WTO. • 11/3/99 Keith Orton (OIR) receives Calendar of WTO events via e-mail; events listed include "Shut Down the WTO, mass nonviolent direct action" sponsored by DAN/Global Exchange/Rainforest Action Network/Ruckus Society. E-mail states, "Join us in nonviolently and creatively stopping them from meeting." 	<p>➤ <u>Arrest and prisoner processing plans</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SPD After Action Report (p. 64) references a Prisoner Processing subcommittee, but WTO ARC staff have no documentation of this subcommittee's activities. • SPD apparently produced (undated) WTO Arrest Procedures for Platoons, Field Prisoner Processing Team Procedures, and Sand Point Prisoner Processing Team Procedures.⁵² • SPD also consulted with the City Attorney's Office as well as the Jail, Municipal Court and KC Prosecutor's Office in developing arrest plans.⁵³ • SPD did plan to include a "Flying Squad" of 10-25 officers assigned to "prevent, deter, monitor, intervene and make arrests" in response to unlawful behavior "that may also be a by-product of this conference."⁵⁴ • Other agencies did produce written plans: • WTO Intergovernmental Workgroup (led by Judge Helen Halpert & including Seattle Municipal Court, King Co. District Court, City Atty's office, SPD, KCSO) developed WTO booking and filing policies.⁵⁵ • WSP produced written WTO Prisoner Processing Procedures and charging guidelines and conducted training sessions for WSP personnel.⁵⁶ • KCSO produced draft arrest procedures to be used if KCSO's Crowd Response Teams were deployed.⁵⁷ 	<p>responsibilities of these teams.</p> <p>According to the SPD After-Action Report, Sand Point was chosen as the processing facility because the standard jail facilities were too small to handle both WTO arrest processing and their normal prisoner processing loads.⁵⁸</p> <p>➤ <u>Planning & Resource Chronology</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10/6/99 - Norm Stamper sends letter to Michael Graber, Director of the King County Correctional Facility, requesting a commitment to provide aid in transporting any arrested WTO protesters. • 10/18/99 – WSP begins developing a 'mass arrest procedure plan' for WTO. The plan was to use the WSP/Bellevue Traffic Investigative Division personnel to staff Sand Point processing center on Tues. Nov. 30, and serve on-call Dec. 1-3.⁵⁹ • 10/22/99 – Multi agency meeting held (SPD, WSP, King Co. prosecutor's office, Seattle Municipal prosecutor's office) to discuss arrest procedures and possible crimes pertaining to protesters. • 10/31/99 – SPD Capt. Caldwell sends reminder to Sgt. Pratt asking, "If we make 600 arrests in the week will you have enough of [vehicles, supplies, paperwork, cameras]?? Make sure you know where and how to get replacements of any of the above if you run out!"⁶⁰ • 11/10/99, The WTO Intergovernmental Workgroup irons out guidelines regarding the use of the Sand Point Brig. Sandpoint was to be used for pre-booking only if a large number of defendants were arrested. With the exception of felons and violent misdemeanants, who were to be booked directly into the King County Jail, once booked, the King Co. Dept. of Adult Detention would transport defendants who are to be booked from Sand Point to King County Jail. If King County Jail reached capacity, DAD would transport prisoners to RJC."⁶¹ • 11/16/99 – SPD and WSP personnel tour Sand Point processing facility, to aid in logistics planning.⁶² 	<p>Felony – 4</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many citizens and protesters reported that those who were causing property damage and vandalism were not promptly arrested. • SPD's Situational Assessment Teams (SAT). originally deployed to gather intelligence, made 33 arrests.⁶⁹ <p>➤ <u>Operational Decisions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to a lack of manpower, the flying squad was redeployed to problem areas on November 29th. As a result of "continuous staffing shortfalls", it was never reestablished.⁷⁰ • When Ruckus Society representatives expressed their desire to facilitate 500-1,500 civil disobedience arrests for Nov. 30, SPD commanders stated that they would be unable to conduct arrests while also ensuring venue security and staffing for the labor march. The Ruckus Society representative reportedly responded that people would then have to "find some way to get arrested."⁷¹ <p>➤ <u>Delays in Prisoner Processing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While SPD's downtown Field Prisoner Processing Team remained at 1 Sgt. and 8 detectives throughout the week, staffing levels of the Sand Point processing team varied. The baseline level – which was the staffing level on Tues. 11/30/99, was a sergeant and 7 detectives, plus support staff (3 fingerprinters, warehouse, 2 admin assistants). On 12/1/99 the level was increased to 84 officers and police recruits, including personnel from SPD, Seattle Police Academy, UW Police, KKC Jail, Kirkland PD, and Bainbridge PD.⁷² • The prisoner processing teams "became overwhelmed during periods of mass arrest due to the requirements of photographing the prisoner and gaining officer information on the transfer of the prisoner."⁷³ • The Mayor's office received multiple reports of prisoners being mistreated at
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<p>5. Conference proceeds.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delegates are able to reach all conference locations. Security of delegates is ensured 	<p><i>Anti-WTO protests in Geneva, 1998</i> In Nov. 1998, visiting WTO officials describe the 1998 riots to the Seattle bid committee, including SPD and mayor's office representatives.⁷⁵</p> <p>In a March 2000 interview, Ray Waldmann states that he had been given a tape of the Geneva protests in May 1999 and promptly turned it over to SPD.⁷⁶</p> <p><i>"J18" protest in London in June, 1999</i> A September 12 article in the London <i>Sunday Times</i> reports that the same groups that coordinated the June 18 (J18) "carnival against capitalism" in London are coordinating direct action at the Seattle WTO meetings.⁷⁷</p> <p><i>Protester trainings, plans</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 9/15/99 - Ruckus Society begins its weeklong activist training camp, Globalize This! Courses, reported in the <i>P-I</i> and <i>Times</i>, include "How to reconnoiter areas for protests, how to blockade objects and streets," and "creating mass civil disturbances."⁷⁸ 	<p>➤ <i>Travel between hotels and venues: chutes and escorts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Details of the Public Safety Committee's operational plans for dignitary escorts and transportation can be found in the 11/3/99 Operation Guide, Annexes U and F. 11/3/99 -- Public Safety Committee planned to maintain chutes, or travel routes, for the downtown core for use by police-escorted heads of state and SHO's shuttle buses and chauffeured sedans. Planners intended to close the chutes to non-WTO traffic 45 minutes before each event and open the chutes 30 minutes after the last dignitary arrived. Chutes were intended to permit an "as normal as possible" traffic flow when not in use.⁸⁵ 11/3/99 -- For dignitary travel to venues outside of downtown, traffic escorts were to be provided for heads of state only; other attendees were to travel in SHO-provided transportation (e.g. shuttle buses). 11/3/99 -- Any unusual occurrences affecting traffic management were to be handled jointly by the 3 SPD escort commanders and the WSP escort 	<p>➤ <i>Travel between hotels and venues: chutes and escorts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3/25/99 - Norm Stamper sends a letter to Ronald Legan of the Secret Service, requesting that the Service provide motorcycle escort training to SPD and allied agencies.⁸⁹ 6/29/99 - SPD sends letters to allied agencies requesting their assistance with motorcade escorts.⁹⁰ September -November, 1999 - Multi-agency escort training is held.⁹¹ <i>Restricting access to venues</i> The Public Safety Committee's plans to restrict access to WTO venues to authorized individuals are detailed in two bodies of documents: Venue security for hotels and event locations can be found in the 11/3/99 Operation Guide, Annexes C through O, and are summarized under "venue security." Plans for credentialing, i.e. identifying authorized individuals: 6/28/99 - Norm Stamper sends a letter to 	<p>➤ <i>Travel between hotels and venues: chutes and escorts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The planned motorcade escorts and shuttles between the airport and downtown Seattle had no problems. At 9:30 AM on November 30, SHO advised all delegates and WTO personnel to stay in their hotels until order was restored and their safety could be ensured. From November 30 to December 3, delegates frequently complained of being assaulted on the streets by protesters and prevented from reaching the Convention Center. On several occasions, delegates attempting to travel to or from the Convention Center were trapped by protesters and had to be rescued by police. Planned SHO chauffeur and shuttle service between the hotels and the Convention Center was forced to shut down for periods of time due to protesters blocking the routes. Union and University streets - the main routes for delegates to use to walk to the Convention Center - were taken over by

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/06/99 - <i>Seattle Post-Intelligencer</i> reports on student & labor plans for a city-wide walkout, "the better to clog up the area around the Convention Center." Article says "Labor is the key to a successful walk out."⁷⁹ • 11/23/99 - <i>Seattle Times</i> article quotes Ruckus Society Director as saying, "These people came to shut the WTO down. That will entail breaking some laws."⁸⁰ • 9/13/99, Keith Orton e-mails copy of <i>London Sunday Times</i> article (9/12/99) to individuals at WCIT, Seattle Chamber, which states "Militant groups, including Reclaim the Streets and Earth First, which coordinated the June 18 (J18) action, have been in contact with their American counterparts to launch a simultaneous campaign on November 30th." One of the organizers attended the WA direct action training camp.⁸¹ <p><i>Anarchist info</i> 9/2/99 - <i>Seattle Weekly's</i> Geov Parrish reports that anarchists responsible for riots in Eugene, OR on June 18th plan to travel to Seattle to protest the WTO.⁸²</p> <p>09/10/99 - <i>Seattle Times</i> article quotes Mike Dolan as saying, "You know, with the anarchists from Eugene, it'll be, 'Badges? We don't need no stinking badges.'"⁸³</p> <p>09/19/99 - Anarchist website, http://www.infoshop.org/no2wto.html, issues a "Call to Protest" encouraging protesters to come to Seattle and "shut down the WTO" The site also gives tips and guidelines for demonstrators.</p> <p>11/9/99 - Mayor's office receives or prints information from N30 Direct Action website (www.agtlprop.org/artandrevolution/wto/n30.html) describing plans for "a large scale, well organized high visibility action to SHUT DOWN the World Trade Organization. We will nonviolently</p>	<p>commander.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chute routes are redacted in the Public Safety Committee Operations Guide. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Restricting access to venues</i> The Public Safety Committee's plans to restrict access to WTO venues to authorized individuals are detailed in two bodies of documents: • Venue security for hotels and event locations can be found in the 11/3/99 Operation Guide, Annexes C through O, and are summarized under "venue security." • Plans for credentialing, i.e. identifying authorized individuals: • 6/28/99 - Norm Stamper sends a letter to Ronald Legan requesting that the Secret Service provide SPD with their credentialing procedures for high-security events.⁸⁶ • 11/3/99 - Operation Guide, Annex Y, details credentialing procedures. • 11/3/99 - SPD Directive 99-82, Credentialing Procedures, is issued.⁸⁷ • 11/3/99 -- Venues within Seattle's jurisdiction had a Capt. or Lt. assigned, with operational responsibilities for events occurring inside the venue and outside to the curb line. Access and security for primary venues were to be controlled via: • An outer perimeter staffed by law enforcement • A middle perimeter staffed by private contract security and SHO who were to check id & list for permission to enter, includes magnetometer, • An inner perimeter (SHO, WTO personnel determine who can enter meeting rooms).⁸⁸ 	<p>Ronald Legan requesting that the Secret Service provide SPD with their credentialing procedures for high-security events.⁸²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/3/99 - Operation Guide, Annex Y, details credentialing procedures. • 11/3/99 - SPD Directive 99-82, Credentialing Procedures, is issued.⁸³ • 11/24/99 - Seattle city employees are given credentialing forms.⁸⁴ • 1/13/00 - According to the SHO "Lessons Learned" report, "Secret Service accreditation issues changed from venue to venue and from time to time during the week" (p. 4), "outside [credentialing] consultants were hired only weeks before the event", "basic questions...were left unanswered", and "credentialing of staff and volunteers was so problematic that we are fortunate that more mischief did not occur" (p. 7).⁸⁵ • SPD After-Action Report (p. 24-25) describes the credentialing plan and calls it "undefined and constantly changing" (p. 24). • March 2000 - In an interview, Keith Orton reports that credentialing "was one of the most frustrating aspects of the whole process - nobody knew what they were doing...It was beyond our control."⁸⁶ <p>➤ <i>Venues secured</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Details of the Public Safety Committee's operational plans for venue security—hotels and event locations--can be found in the 11/3/99 Operation Guide, Annexes C through O. • 10/9/99 - <i>Seattle Times</i> article, "Paramount drops curtain on WTO protesters, cites 'security reasons'", describes how the Paramount Theatre, citing the possibility of booby traps and vandalism, cancelled a reservation by protest groups who had booked the theatre for the day before the WTO.⁸⁷ • Magnetometers were used to screen entrants: • 10/23/99 - SHO starts talking with vendors about providing magnetometers.⁸⁸ • 11/24/99 - SHO and SPD sign 	<p>protesters on November 30, leaving the delegates with no safe path to travel.</p> <p>➤ <i>Conference activities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The WTO Opening Ceremonies, scheduled to start at 9:30 AM on November 30, were postponed at 10 AM and finally cancelled at 12:45 PM when only a few hundred out of 5000 delegates had arrived. • The Ministerial Dinner held at the Museum of Flight on the evening of November 30 was not fully attended, due to some delegates being unable to safely travel from their hotels to the Museum. • The Arts Night event planned for the evening of December 2nd was cancelled. • The WTO Closing Ceremonies planned for December 3rd were cancelled. <p>➤ <i>Restricting access to venues</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On at least two occasions, uncredentialed protesters entered the Convention Center and harassed delegates inside. • The Convention Center, Sheraton Hotel, and Westin Hotel all went into lockdown mode at certain times during the week.
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	<p>and creatively block them from meeting."⁸⁴</p> <p>11/29/99 - SPD After-Action Report (p. 35) describes protesters overheard saying "Wait until tomorrow" and "Save it for Tuesday".</p>		<p>memorandum of understanding agreeing that SPD reserve officers will staff the magnetometers and will be paid by SHO.⁹⁹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> March 2000 - Pat Davis confirms in an interview that the federal government paid for the magnetometers.¹⁰⁰ 	
<p>6. Disruptions to daily life are minimized</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil society functions Downtown stores and businesses remain open. A sense of safety is promoted 	<p>➤ <i>Previous WTO meeting featured riots</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11/98 – Visiting WTO officials describe the 1998 riots to the Seattle bid committee, including SPD and mayor's office representatives.¹⁰¹ 5/99 – SHO representatives travel to Geneva and are given two copies of a video of a French TV show about the riots at the 1998 WTO meeting. Upon their return, a copy is given to SPD.¹⁰² 6/18/99 – Rioting occurs in London, New York and Eugene, OR, stemming from the "J18" protests against a G-7 meeting in Cologne <p>➤ <i>Protester plans likely to disrupt normal activities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4/23/99 – <i>Wall Street Journal</i> reports that the steelworkers hope to mobilize 50,000 people to protest labor disparities.¹⁰³ 5/13/99 – King Co. Sheriff's Office Capt. Ron Griffin meets with SPD representatives, who inform him that their intelligence indicates that WTO protest organizers may amass as many as 10,000-50,000 demonstrators.¹⁰⁴ 9/2/99 - <i>Seattle Weekly's</i> Geov Parrish reports that anarchists responsible for riots in Eugene, OR on June 18th plan to travel to Seattle to protest the WTO.¹⁰⁵ 10/28/99 - A large group of protesters apparently from Earth First sneak onto a secured floor in a Seattle high-rise office building, then open fire doors to let other protesters in. They are arrested and removed by police, but promise to return in larger numbers during WTO.¹⁰⁶ 11/2/99 - SPD receives information that protest groups are planning to 	<p>➤ <i>Traffic Disruptions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Early in the planning, SPD decided to create traffic chutes for official vehicles to use. These chutes would be open to normal traffic unless they needed to be closed, in sharp contrast with the NATO summit in Washington D.C., where the police cordoned off a huge section of the downtown area. 9/27/99 - A status report on the progress of the city-wide communications plan states that "a subcommittee led by SeaTran has been formed...to ensure that visitors and commuters are aware of the best access routes to and from downtown Seattle" and that "early and continuous information will be provided to City departments, commuters, shoppers, visitors, retailers, and employers via briefings and the media."¹¹² 10/29/99 - Mayor Schell sends a letter to Seattle business owners. The letter details planned street closures and events that may disrupt traffic; it also states that "in general, we expect traffic to be heavier than usual...WTO participants will likely be traveling to and from their session during peak commuting periods." It further cautions that "some streets may be closed intermittently", "drivers should not count on finding on-street parking during the WTO event", and "there are sure to be last-minute developments with a specific impact on traffic that cannot be specifically planned for or announced in advance."¹¹³ The information contained in this letter was also available on the City's official WTO website, along with maps of the street closures and march routes. 11/10/99 - The <i>Seattle Times</i> publishes an article on WTO planning that includes a list of the planned street closures.¹¹⁴ 11/12/99 - Mayor Schell sends a memo to 	<p>➤ <i>Police planning</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11/9/99 Public Safety Committee Operations Plan states that the Demonstration Management Plan Mission includes insuring "the safety of all conference attendees and citizens of the affected regions during the Conference."¹²² 11/03/99 SPD planned to allocate 230 officers among 4 Demonstration Management Platoons. Platoon A (45 people) was to be the initial contact platoon, chiefly responsible for monitoring scheduled demonstrations, assisting with traffic control, assisting with perimeter security, and providing a visible deterrent to criminal activity. Platoon B and C were to handle crisis management, with Platoon B as backup to Platoon A, while Platoon C was to be a mobile force responsible for demonstrations away from WSCTC and Paramount Theater. Platoons D & E were to be on standby, in Class A uniforms. Police briefed Downtown Seattle Association, Building Owners & Managers Association, West Precinct Private Security forum, Human Service Provider Form and construction sites (After Action Report, p. 11) <p>➤ <i>Courts cancel jury trials</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8/9/99 Ed Joiner writes to Judge Helen Halpert, Seattle Municipal Court, warning her that traffic impacts from the WTO may create problems for jurors in reaching the courts and requesting that the amount of time spent in court by police employees be eliminated or minimized to allow them to attend to WTO-related duties. Similar letters also sent to Mark Sidran and Norm Maleng.¹²³ 10/8/99 <i>Seattle Times</i> reports that King Co. judges cancel jury trials during WTO week because of concerns about prospective 	<p>➤ <i>Traffic Disruptions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During most of WTO week, the downtown core was largely inaccessible to all but official vehicles. Traffic was either extremely congested or unable to enter the area at all, and Metro buses were often forced to reroute or cancel routes. Traffic Bulletins were issued daily by the mayor's office throughout the week. <p>➤ <i>Concern for Downtown Businesses</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Businesses and consumers were given confusing and contradictory messages. Shoppers, employees and residents were sometimes tear-gassed while trying to go about their business. The curfew imposed by the Mayor prevented people from reaching their homes and businesses, and from shopping downtown. Downtown businesses lost millions of dollars due to vandalism and lost revenue.

	<p>take over timber company offices in Seattle on November 4th. The protests are characterized as WTO-related.¹⁰⁷</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/9/99 Workers and Students for Walkout Network (WASFAWN) website state, "The Mass Direction Action by DAN participants will be to physically stop the WTO from convening on the morning of November 30th....all [tactics] are intended to shut down the downtown area in order to stop business as usual for one day."¹⁰⁸ • 11/14/99 - SPD receives an email describing "Steal Something Day", an effort by a Montreal-based anarchist group to get protesters to steal from stores on November 26th. The email was originally sent to the "N30" listserv, a list for protest groups planning to come to WTO.¹⁰⁹ • 11/17/99 - FBI Threat Update, "The FBI assesses the threat of terrorism and violent protest activity directed at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle as low to medium."¹¹⁰ • 11/17/99 - FBI Threat Update, "Protest groups from other areas and those local to Eugene who have associated with Art & Revolution in the past are known to adhere to violent philosophies, essentially believing that any type of action, including acts of violence that could cause injuries, is appropriate to further their objectives."¹¹¹ 	<p>City employees informing them that "at this time, the official conference schedule and venues should not significantly impact the area surrounding our downtown City office buildings, but your commute times may be affected" and that "employees who are concerned about possible commuting delays...may request vacation leave, compensatory time, executive/merit leave, or an adjusted work schedule."¹¹⁵ This memo was attached to employees' paychecks on 11/18/99.¹¹⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/25/99 - A <i>Seattle Times</i> article states that "[retailers] are concerned about the effect on business arising from street closures during the conference."¹¹⁷ Another article published the same day details the parking difficulties that will be encountered during WTO and lists which garages will be closed.¹¹⁸ • 11/26/99 - A <i>Seattle Times</i> article states that "The crunch of holiday traffic will be intensified by thousands of trade delegates and protesters, and by the heavy security surrounding a visit by Clinton and other heads of state, possibly including Cuban President Fidel Castro." The article also refers to the conference as "immobilizing the city core" and states that "retailers [are] facing a gridlocked downtown."¹¹⁹ • 11/24/99 - The Seattle School District issues a press release stating that Seattle schools "will operate on a conference schedule Tuesday, Nov. 30" to "assure the safety of its students" and that this decision was in direct response to the labor march.¹²⁰ • 11/27/99 - According to a <i>Seattle Times</i> article, many Seattle schools are planning to close on Monday and Tuesday due to concerns about traffic and safety.¹²¹ 	<p>jurors not being able to reach trials.¹²⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/99, SPD WTOC Fact Sheet states, Law enforcement will cooperate with peaceful demonstrators and resolve acts of civil disobedience in a timely and safe matter. Anyone engaging in criminal conduct will face arrest and removal from the scene."¹²⁵ <p>➤ <i>Concern for Downtown Businesses</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5/13/99 - Discussion at City WTO Coordinating Committee meeting, "There is a real concern about what effect the conference will have on shoppers – the City wants to send a message loud and strong that people should come downtown and shop – this conference should not deter them. The main theme the Mayor wants to get out to everyone is that the WTO is a good thing for Seattle"¹²⁶ • 9/17/99 - A memo from Dwight Dively, ESD, to Mayor Schell states that "we expect that one of the larger [insurance] exposures may be Business Interruption and Loss of Income claims from downtown businesses who have a track record of high sales over Thanksgiving weekend and who may be affected by the protest marches which are being predicted."¹²⁷ • 10/1/99 - Schell Mail #39 states that "Though there's been a lot of talk about protests and demonstrations, without question these are overblown."¹²⁸ • 10/29/99 - Mayor Schell sends a letter to Seattle Business Owners, warning of traffic impacts, street closures and limitations on on-street parking. The letter also says that "it is estimated that approximately \$11 million dollars of revenue will be generated through sales receipts during the week of the event."¹²⁹ <p>➤ <i>Traffic Disruptions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9/21/99 - At a meeting of public relations representatives, it is decided that "SeaTran will produce a map of downtown, showing routes into the area and where to find off-street parking...these maps will be posted on the Internet and included in news releases." The issue of relocating Convention Center parkers is also 	
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			<p>raised.¹³⁰</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9/28/99 - SeaTran representatives, among others, meet with protest leaders to plan a route for the labor march. One of the paramount concerns in choosing the route is the impact on traffic. Access to downtown businesses is also a factor.¹³¹ • 11/2/99 – City plans to close streets around Convention Center for security. • 11/10/99 - SeaTran holds a meeting with the Business Owners and Management Association and hands out a packet of information on street closures, march routes and traffic reroutes. • 11/18/99 - The City sets up "WTO Traffic Alert", an email list to alert subscribers of traffic problems. 2500 people are subscribed as of the 18th. The first alert is sent on November 24th.¹³² • 11/18/99 - A <i>Seattle Times</i> article quotes the general manager of Union Square as saying "We've been advising tenants to treat it [traffic] as if a blizzard came in and dropped 2 feet of snow."¹³³ • 11/22/99 - The mayor's office issues a press release describing the City's negotiations with the People's Assembly regarding the denial of their march permit application. The release states that the application was denied due to concerns about keeping downtown accessible.¹³⁴ <p>➤ <i>Communications</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The City set up a public information center within the EOC. Between 16 and 19 people were assigned to this center, as well as 4 people in the field. Positions in the EOC included Communications Director, Media Support, Communications Monitor (Internal and External), Writer (Internal, External, and Floater), Floater (PIO Room and EOC Ops Room), Continuity Officer, and Web Support. These positions were staffed 24 hours a day throughout the week.¹³⁵ 	
<p>7. City officials, particularly SPD, had appropriate plans for which they were properly trained and adequately staffed.</p>	<p>All threats listed in previous sections apply. In addition, documents recently acquired by WTO ARC staff include the following evidence of threats to this goal:</p>	<p>➤ <i>Plans and Planning Process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The principal plan document for public safety operations during the WTO Conference is the Public Safety Committee's Operations Guide. The plan consists of a series of operational plans 	<p>➤ <i>Resources allocated to the planning process</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Public Safety Executive Committee first met on February 12th; the broader Public Safety Committee held its first meeting one month later on March 11, 	

<p>*Section addresses only SPD plans & staffing.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5/99 - SPD'd briefing packet to PSC subcommittee members included a summary of the Geneva protests provided by the FBI (presumably at the first Public Safety Executive Committee meeting that was convened by the FBI).¹³⁶ • 11/9/99 – The PSC Intelligence Subcommittee, led by SPD Lt. Lorette, presented a briefing paper which “described, in detail, possible and probable criminal activities to be directed against the WTOC. Possible crimes included blocking city streets and sidewalks...property damage, banner hangings...”¹³⁷ • 11/23/99 -- PSC Intelligence Subcommittee distributes a second briefing paper which included “information relating to simultaneous marches meeting at the area of the Paramount Theater/Convention Center set for the am hours of 11/30,” that would include anarchist affinity groups, and that the participants’ goal was, “to prevent Clinton from speaking and WTO from meeting on 11/30. Groups will have particular agendas, e.g. lockdowns/blockades via tripods, police confrontations with possible occupation o sites etc.”¹³⁸ • By this time, SPD was also aware that the ‘assault’ was likely to be “pie-shaped”, i.e. that groups would converge from all directions towards a single point.¹³⁹ • 11/12/99 – WTO Incident Command staff briefed on information contained within the briefing papers.¹⁴⁰ • 11/23/99 MACC and SPOC personnel receive oral briefing on intelligence materials including the 11/23 briefing paper. This apparently leads to the creation of a Flying Squad, referred to as “Hammer” tactic.¹⁴¹ • 11/28/99 -- Mayor Schell and EOC commanders receive oral intelligence briefing from PSC Intelligence 	<p>developed by each Public Safety Subcommittee and by venue commanders plus intelligence and logistical plans. Other accessory and/or independent plans include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrest planning materials • Flying Squad operations order • Thanksgiving Parade demonstration management plan • West Precinct Operations Orders • According to Ed Joiner, the Operations Guide was distributed to all Public Safety Committee members (though it is not clear whether this was just the Executive Committee or the broader Public Safety Committee) on or around November 3, 1999. • Review of the Operations Guide was informal and did not require written approval by all agencies, as had been done for the Goodwill Games, so acceptance, objections or reservations by other agencies were not documented. The SPD After Action report recommends: “a formal process requiring review and written approval by all agencies as the plan is developed...this kind of thorough system of review, written acceptance and check and balance is only possible with adequate funding for planning and operations.”¹⁴³ • On October 8th the Secret Service advance team was to review each venue and operation plan. Due to space and time limitations, SPD limited participation to venue commanders only, which effectively limited participation to SPD personnel. Individuals from other agencies participating in the SWAT and Dignitary Escort operations would need to contact the SPD commanders to make suggestions and hear the results.¹⁴⁴ <p><u>Chemical Agents & Less Lethal Munitions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10/99 - SPD’s “Policies and Procedures” directive covering operational procedures during “Unusual Occurrences” was published and states that the “Use of individually issued less lethal weapons 	<p>1999.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD established a full-time WTOC planning unit staffed with 1 Captain (Wingstrand), 1 Lieutenant (Reed), 1 Sergeant (Fowler), and 2-5 officers. All others, including venue commanders, had to plan for their assignment in addition to their normal responsibilities. • An SPD official told WTO ARC staff that this event normally would have been assigned to SPD’s Special Events unit, but they were occupied with Y2K planning. • Lt. Reed wrote in his after action notes to the Chief, “Integrated planning, policy development, training, deployment and command functions can provide the most effective utilization of resources.”¹⁵³ • Lt. Reed, “The planning for this event was hampered by the lack of commitment from the elected officials who encouraged the bid committee to compete for hosting the WTO conference in Seattle.”¹⁵⁴ • Lt. Reed, “Problems encountered in the planning and operation of the public safety support for the 1999 Seattle Ministerial flowed from the limitations imposed regarding budget. Early on, it was clear to me that no special funding outside of existing resources would be available for SPD to plan, train and operate for the event.”¹⁵⁵ <p><u>Chemical Agents & Less Lethal Munitions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to Capt. Moffat, only a limited supply of chemical agents was purchased for several reasons:¹⁵⁶ • To save money that might be needed for other supplies. • Because chemical agents have a four-year shelf life, so excess supplies would likely be wasted. • Because SPD had not deployed chemical weapons in many years, so it was unclear that they would be needed to control crowds. <p>➤ <i>Training</i></p> <p>Demonstration Management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5/14/99 – KCSO begins discussing their 	
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	<p>Subcommittee.¹⁴²</p> <p>(i.e. batons) is not prohibited by the policy, but should be strictly controlled."¹⁴⁵</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DATE? - Prior to the WTO Ministerial, SPD SWAT Commander Capt. Moffat reported that if less-lethal munitions were needed then SPD had about two days' supply.¹⁴⁶ He said that "this was considered adequate in light of a strong contingency plan for quickly re-supply."¹⁴⁷ • 11/13/99 – The Tactical Operations Plan is revised and states, "in the event that crowd control problems require the use of chemical agents, it will be necessary to immediately order additional munitions."¹⁴⁸ Moffat later states that he arranged for FBI air resources to air lift additional supplies from Casper Wyoming.¹⁴⁹ • McCarthy & Associates state, "Although no mention of the resupply plan was found in either the Operations Plan or Guide, reviewers were told that the resupply effort had been planned for in advance. However, reviewers located a Police Department Purchase & Supply Request form which reflects that the order was not placed until November 30, 1999... <i>Whether this representation was an inadvertent oversight or an attempt to mislead the review team is unknown.</i>"¹⁵⁰ <p>Expert evaluations of adequacy of the plan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McCarthy & Associates, policing consultants hired by the Mayor and SPD to provide an independent review of police options, concluded that the plan should have included: • "a reasonable, restricted safety zone encompassing selected venues and transportation routes." • "the highly visible deployment of regionalized demonstration management personnel in a pre-emptive role no later than November 26, 1999." • Improved, written mass arrest and booking procedures • "mutual aid police, procedure and response requirements." • Greater involvement of state, local and area law enforcement agencies in its 	<p>ability to assist SPD with crowd control issues and evaluating what training and equipment will be needed to get their Civil Response Teams operational again. The initial assessment is \$220,000.¹⁵⁷</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • July 1999 – SPD officers and supervisors up to rank of Capt. attended 3-day (24 hrs) "Civil Disorder Resolution II: Command Strategies" course offered Int'l Assn. Of Chiefs of Police and taught by Richard Odenthal. Only 2 Assistant Chiefs attend and the Chief of Police attends none. • Oct. 1999 – Odenthal returns and teaches a second 16-hr training course for platoon sergeants and lieutenants.¹⁵⁸ • Fall 1999 – Sgts Ron and Don Smith design and teach a 9-hour crowd control training course for all officers & sergeants (# participants unknown). Platoons also practice formations for 15 minutes/day 2-4 days per week. • Nov. 10-17 – Each platoon does a 4-hour crowd control training at the Kingdome • Fall 1999 – SPD's Chemical Agent Response Teams participate in three 8-hr training sessions. • Fall 1999 – SWAT tem members attend a 32-hr Weapons of Mass Destruction course at Ft. McClellan, Alabama.¹⁵⁹ • Nov. 17 – SPD holds a 'dress rehearsal' – all 4 platoons plus chemical agent teams drill together with commanders at the Kingdome for 4 hours. • "What If" Scenarios – Demo Mgmt. Commanders instruct Sgt. Grant Tietje to prepare a series of "What If" scenarios, including ones entitled, "Overload [of demo mgmt's capabilities]" and "March." • Early Nov., A/C Ed Joiner circulates the "What If" scenarios to all Operations Bureau commanders, encouraging them to "spend time going through the scenarios and to discuss possible responses or courses of action."¹⁶⁰ <p>Incident Command</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unknown date, commanders participate in an 8 hour crisis incident course.¹⁶¹ • Nov. 1999 - Several SPD commanders attend one or both of 2 tabletop exercises 	
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		<p>development.¹⁵¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD's own After Action Report offered the following critique: • Planning time was too short. "If lead time is assessed to be inadequate the Police Department must advise the Executive." • The Planning Group and Subcommittee structure worked well to create collaboration and involvement of necessary agencies." • "The planning model should consist of dedicated full time planning personnel representing all impacted agencies; written agreements, memoranda and contracts defining all deployments and operations; and an integrated review process for decisions concerning planning, deployment and command." • The plan should have provided for coordination and controlled deployment of incoming mutual aid assets. • "The planning for contingencies did not go deep enough – planning should be centered on a progression of escalating contingencies – plans for these contingencies should be detailed and each should include command and control systems, logistics, provision for relief and meals, systems to coordinate, track and deploy arriving assets, etc." (p. 52) • McCarthy & Associates (Mayor's consultants): • "The Operations Plan should have provided for a reasonable, restricted safety zone encompassing selected venues and transportation routes." (p. 187) • "The Operations Plan should have provided for the highly visible deployment of regionalized demonstration management personnel in a pre-emptive role no later than November 26, 1999." (p. 187) • "The Operations plan should have addressed more thoroughly mutual aid policy, procedure and response requirements." (p. 187) • McCarthy's recommendations include: • Ensuring that planners prepare for a worst 	<p>sponsored by the Secret Service and FBI.¹⁶²</p> <p>Gas Masks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD After Action report states that 900 new gas masks were purchased and issued, and that each recipient received a 1 ½ hour OSHA mandated training session to 'fit test' the mask (p. 31) • Gas mask training (aka "respiratory protection fit testing"), led by Sgt. Hansen, Det. Hawkes and others, apparently began as early as August 19, 1999 and continued through Nov. 22, 1999.¹⁶³ <p>Multi-agency training:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was coordinated multi-agency training for motorcycle dignitary escorts, including a 2-day training course provided by the Secret Service that was attended by officers from SPD, KCSO, WSP, Bellevue and Kent. Unfortunately due to space limitations imposed by the Secret Service, Bellevue and Kent officers were not permitted to participate in the field practice sessions held the second day. In addition, escorts were required to complete basic escort and advanced training sessions as well as a city orientation ride. • According to the SPD After Action Report, UW and Tukwila officers participated in some SPD crowd management training.¹⁶⁴ <p>Expert opinions re: adequacy of training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Richard Odenthal, a crowd control expert hired by SPD to conduct two training sessions wrote in his post-event review, "The Department had essentially no riot control experience at any level with relatively little training in crowd/riot control at any level. Most officers had only 8-16 hours of basic dismounted formation training prior to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Convention. The command staff had no riot experience and only limited classroom training prior to the event."¹⁶⁵ • McCarthy report recommendation, p. 127, "It is the opinion of the reviewers that sufficient training was provided to 	
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		<p>case scenario</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring that sufficient time is allocated to plan and prepare for future major events • Reconsider the application of the mobile field force concept of operation [this is the approach taught by Odenthal].¹⁵² 	<p>Department personnel assigned to specialized functions, such as demonstration management, SWAT, escort services and dignitary protection...patrol and detective personnel should have also received additional training in anticipation of having to utilize them to supplement or relieve personnel on an emergency basis."</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McCarthy report recommendation p. 82, "Ensure that all command-level personnel from the rank of chief of Police through captain receive formalized training in the management of critical incidents." ¹⁶⁶ <p>➤ <i>Staffing resources allocated to plan implementation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The variations in event staffing levels are detailed separately (see table prepared by Cynthia). • 11/5/99 - A memo from Vern McRae to Lt. Simeon Tamayo states that "this conference...will demand a substantial number of support personnel that will be well beyond the resources of the Property Management Unit."¹⁶⁷ • At the end of August, prior Special Patrol Unit (similar to SWAT) members were asked to serve as "primary Chemical Agent Officers" for the mobile field force platoons, and to attend a refresher training course. ¹⁶⁸ • SPD After Action Report p. 53, "Prisoner processing was understaffed and the procedures/protocol proved ineffective." The protocol should "include contingency plans to immediately increasing staffing according to situational needs." • SPD Dignitary Escort Commander Lt. Belshay obtained informal mutual aid assistance from the Kent PD, Bellevue PD, KCSO, WSP and Tacoma PD motorcycle squads. • 9/15/99 - Tacoma PD withdrew its mutual aid commitment on Sept. 15th stating in a letter that they were withdrawing their motorcycle officers (promised to Lt. Belshay) due to the uncertainty of reimbursement. ¹⁶⁹ • McCarthy report, p. 75, "Although Captain Pugel made every effort to provide direction 	
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			and support to his platoons, he simply could not be everywhere at once...If an additional captain, or preferably two, had been assigned to oversee designated geographical sectors, and platoon commanders empowered with additional authority and responsibility, a more concerted effort might have been possible in dispersing and arresting protesters. <i>It is understood that assignment of additional field commanders would have required personnel which were not available.</i> ¹⁷⁰	
	•	<p>➤ Logistics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> General planning Vern McRae, SPD's quartermaster, was tasked with providing logistical support for the SPD WTOC operations. 6/28/999 - Memo from Vern McRae to Dan Bryant states that "it appears that the amount of human resources that will be required to provide the logistical support function is going to be beyond the range of the Property Management Unit."¹⁷¹ 11/5/99 - A memo from Vern McRae to Lt. Simeon Tamayo states that "this conference...will demand a substantial number of support personnel that will be well beyond the resources of the Property Management Unit."¹⁷² Lt. Dick Reed, one of the fulltime planner, wrote in his personal After Action notes to Chief Stamper, "A ranking member of the department should direct the entire logistics section, from planning, acquisition, delivery, set-up and operations through recovery. This way the command intent will not be obscured by the many competing functionaries in an operation of this magnitude. Lesson learned here was that a civilian manager cannot effectively direct sworn supervisors." ¹⁷³ Meals/rest breaks/bathroom breaks 8/20/99 - Memo from Pugel to Joiner, "Demonstration Management - WTO", states that "adequate nourishment for the employees will have to be available in both a fixed or mobile method based on 	<p>➤ Logistics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resource allocation Quartermaster assigned, but Emergency Management personnel were not. 6/25/99 – Logistics Subcommittee Operations Guide issued. It states that "the Quartermaster Unit will devote its entire physical and human resources to the [WTO] Conference, and will be closed for normal operations during the conference." The Operational Responsibilities for the subcommittee include Officer Parking, Site and Venue Setup, Venue Maintenance, Inventory Control, Meals, Supply, and Transportation. ¹⁷⁸ 11/5/99 - Vern McRae sends a memo to Dick Reed expressing frustration about logistical support for the Convention Center venue. The memo states that "your personnel have failed to resolve concerns I raised...a logistical effort requires everyone to be on the same page and confusion and frustration results when more people are involved than necessary. Therefore my staff and I will provide zero support to the Convention Center Venue and concentrate our efforts and resources on the other venues."¹⁷⁹ Meals/rest breaks/bathroom breaks 11/14/99 – Memo from Vern McRae to Jim Mullen requesting the use of several hundred cots, blankets and pillows during WTO. ¹⁸⁰ 11/17/99 - SPD Directive 99-89, "World Trade Organization Conference - Department Staffing and General 	<p>➤ Logistics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The SPD After-Action Report states, as a Lesson Learned, that "platoons had difficulty getting timely transport for movement from one site to another."¹⁹¹ 2/14/00 - Memo from Bob Berglund to Steve Brown states that the battery distribution system "should have [worked]; however, discharged batteries were not returned in a timely manner to [the] quartermaster for recharge...it appears we needed better battery control to insure discharged batteries were recycled for charging."¹⁹² According to the SPD After-Action Report, "[many] officers could not be afforded rest or meal periods, despite the fact they had been on station for numerous hours by this time. Additionally, the delivery of food, water, radio batteries or other necessary supplies was inadequate. This situation would worsen as the day [November 30th] and the week progressed."¹⁹³ The Report also concludes, as a Lesson Learned, that "many officers did not receive breaks, food or water in a timely manner" and recommends several measures to take to prevent this from happening again. ¹⁹⁴ On December 1, at the request of SPD command staff, the Washington State Incident Management Team #4 was given responsibility for providing logistical support to law enforcement officers working WTO. After meeting with SPD, this team set up "Camp

		<p>the deployment needs of the platoons. Based on the anticipated numbers of persons detailed to this assignment [the demonstration management platoons] there will have to be 208 meals each day to sustain the effort. This does not include water and other incidental snacks."¹⁷⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10/28/99 - In an email to Steven Paulson, Dick Reed states that "if an SPD employee or support person is assigned to a venue or a specialized function, for 12 hours, then we feed them. We do not feed patrol officers or Detectives or other staff who are working long hours but not assigned to the event."¹⁷⁵ • Shelter • 3/29/99 - Norm Stamper sends a letter to Joe Garcia, Facility Operations Director for the City of Seattle, requesting that several areas in the Public Safety Building "be made available for the exclusive use of the Seattle Police Department and other supporting law enforcement agencies between November 15th and December 10th of 1999."¹⁷⁶ • Transportation and Parking • 6/25/99 - Logistics Subcommittee Operations Guide states that "Metro Transit will provide buses and drivers as necessary for Conference security activities."¹⁷⁷ • 8/20/99 - Memo from Jim Pugel to Ed Joiner, "Demonstration Management - WTO", states that "Vans and metro buses with a compliment [sic] of marked patrol units will be need [sic] to support the platoons 	<p>Deployment of Personnel", is issued. The Directive states that "personnel assigned to a World Trade Organization venue assignment or specialized task will be provided one meal during their 12-hour shift. Snacks and beverages will also be provided."¹⁸¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/17/99 – David Kerrigan sends an email to Vern McRae informing him that he is attempting to find a water truck or tanker that can be used for delivering drinking water to officers.¹⁸² • Shelter • 4/23/99 - Joe Garcia sends a letter to Norm Stamper informing him that "In response to your recent letter...we have arranged for [the requested] space to be dedicated for your use".¹⁸³ • 10/14/99 - Email from Dick Reed to Jackie Campbell informing her that SPD is going to use the Dome Room for eating and briefing, and the PSB gym for sleeping and rest breaks.¹⁸⁴ • Reasonable hours • 11/14/99 - Memo from Vern McRae to Jim Mullen states that "personnel will be working twelve hours shifts, or longer as mandated by demonstrations."¹⁸⁵ • 11/17/99 - SPD Directive 99-89, "World Trade Organization Conference - Department Staffing and General Deployment of Personnel", is issued. The Directive states that "commanders shall ensure that personnel assigned to their command are released from duty in order to receive rest prior to reporting to their next venue assignment. The general rule is 8 hours rest between assignments."¹⁸⁶ • Transportation and Parking • 8/1/99 - Norm Stamper and Ed Joiner send a letter to Chief Gene Willard, King County Stadium Administration, inquiring about the availability of parking for police vehicles at the Kingdome during WTO. The request includes "parking space for 750 vehicles".¹⁸⁷ • 8/20/99 - Norm Stamper and Ed Joiner 	<p>Kingdome", a sleeping, showering and eating area for the officers. A smaller sleeping area was also established at the Boeing Field federal building to house State Patrol officers.</p>
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			<p>send a letter to Mark Tiernan, General Services Administration, inquiring about the availability of parking for police vehicles at the Federal Center South during WTO. Space is needed "for a minimum of four hundred vehicles."¹⁸⁸</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11/17/99 - SPD Directive 99-89, "World Trade Organization Conference - Department Staffing and General Deployment of Personnel", is issued. The Directive states that "personnel may choose to park their private vehicles at a location of their choice or park at the Kingdome north parking lot where they may take a designated Metro shuttle to their assigned venue."¹⁸⁹ • Communications • 11/10/99 - Vern McRae sends a memo to Ed Joiner requesting that his office send a memo "directing each stationmaster to make available one-third of their radio batteries and charger units for use during [WTO]."¹⁹⁰ 	
8. The event is fully funded and fiscally responsible. "Fiscally responsible" means that a reasonable budget is developed and a reasonable effort is made to stay within it.	[Addressed by the WTO Invitation Panel]			

¹ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 7/7/99, "Threat Assessment: Biannual Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization, Seattle Washington."

² FBI Counterterrorism Center, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting, Seattle Washington."

³ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 7/7/99, "Threat Assessment: Biannual Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization, Seattle Washington."

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- ⁴ *Seattle Times*, 10/21/99, "Precautions laid for biological or chemical attack at WTO meeting."
- ⁵ Vickery, A.D., 11/24/99, Letter to Lisa Gordon-Hagerty.
- ⁶ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting, Seattle Washington."
- ⁷ Seattle Fire Department security update 10/5/99.
- ⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting."
- ⁹ ⁹ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 11/9/99, "Hospitals on alert for an attack by chemical weapons".
- ¹⁰ Ramsey, R.L., 11/17/99, email to Seattle Fire Department, "WTO Information Sheet."
- ¹¹ Seattle Police Department After Action Report, 4/11/00
- ¹² Wingstrand, Brent, 5/5/99, Memo to Assistant Chief Ed Joiner regarding SWAT Mission for WTO.
- ¹³ Public Safety Committee, 11/03/99, World Trade Organization Conference Operation Guide, Annex S.
- ¹⁴ Public Safety Committee, 11/03/99, World Trade Organization Conference Operation Guide, Annex T.
- ¹⁵ Public Safety Committee, 11/03/99, World Trade Organization Conference Operation Guide, Annex T.
- ¹⁶ Wingstrand, Brent, 10/5/99, email to Alan Vickery, "Hotel evacuation".
- ¹⁷ Martin, Chris, 10/9/99, memo to interested parties, "Meeting re: World Trade Organization Hospital Planning."
- ¹⁸ Vickery, A.D., 10/11/99, memo to James Sewell, "WTO Budget".
- ¹⁹ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 11/9/99, "Hospitals on alert for an attack by chemical weapons".
- ²⁰ Public Safety Committee, 11/9/99, "World Trade Organization Conference Operations Plan," pp. 32-34.
- ²¹ Clavadetscher, David, 11/17/99, email to Ed Joiner.
- ²² 5/4/99, fax from Medic One to SFD, "Dignitary and Delegate Medical Services".
- ²³ Public Safety Committee, 11/09/99, World Trade Organization Conference Public Safety Committee Operations Plan (p. 14)
- ²⁴ Seattle Fire Department After-Action Report, Evaluation/Correction Action Items, p. 1.
- ²⁵ Seattle Fire Department After-Action Report, Incident Action Report for 12/3/99, 2000-800 hours.
- ²⁶ Seattle Fire Department After-Action Report, RMC Report, p. 84.
- ²⁷ Seattle Fire Department After-Action Report, RMC Report, p. 15.
- ²⁸ Seattle Fire Department After-Action Report, Evaluation/Correction Action Items, p. 5.
- ²⁹ Paxton, Kathy, 4/19/00, Interview with Alec Fisk.
- ³⁰ Waldmann, Ray, 3/6/2000, Interview with Alec Fisk and Kirsten Evans, WTO ARC.
- ³¹ *Wall Street Journal*, 4/23/99, "Seattle is bracing..." (Washington Wire)
- ³² Griffin, Ron, 5/14/99, E-mail to Larry Mayes, Jon McCracken, Dave Reichert and Denise Pentony, "CRT Supplemental Budget."
- ³³ *Seattle Weekly*, 9/2/99, "The new anarchists."
- ³⁴ "Seattle City-wide Walkout," 4 p. document printed 11/09/1999, <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/8771/howto.html>
- ³⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting."
- ³⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting."
- ³⁷ Public Safety Committee, 11/09/99, World Trade Organization Conference Public Safety Committee Operations Plan (p. 20)
- ³⁸ Low, Neil, 11/19/99, Seattle Police Department Memorandum to All Concerned, "WTO Operations Order for the 'Flying Squad'."
- ³⁹ Joiner, Ed, 8/9/99, Letter to Judge Helen Halpert, Seattle Municipal Court
- ⁴⁰ *Seattle Times*, 10/8/99, "Officials tackle WTO security, traffic worries."
- ⁴¹ Seattle Police Department, November 1999, World Trade Organization Fact Sheet.
- ⁴² Schell, Paul, 10/29/99, Letter to Seattle Business Owners.
- ⁴³ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 9/15/99, "Ruckus Society getting set to disrupt WTO conference."
- ⁴⁴ *Seattle Times*, 11/2/99, "Downtown traffic will be a mess."
- ⁴⁵ Orton, Keith, 10/29/99, email to Virginia Swanson, Maud Daudon, Jeanne Hansen, and Ed Joiner, "Protester briefings".
- ⁴⁶ Pugel, Jim. Date unknown. Statement made for "World Trade Organization Conference, Demonstration Management, Draft After Action Report."
- ⁴⁷ Paxton, Kathy, 4/19/00, Interview with Alec Fisk. (Previously distributed to the panel)
- ⁴⁸ Waldmann, Ray, 3/6/2000, Interview with Alec Fisk and Kirsten Evans, WTO ARC. (Previously distributed to the panel)
- ⁴⁹ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 7/7/99, "Threat Assessment: Biannual Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization, Seattle Washington." (Previously distributed to the panel)
- ⁵⁰ Anonymous, undated, "General Recap of 11/9 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS," received by WTO ARC staff 5/30/00 with other SPD intelligence materials.
- ⁵¹ FBI Counterterrorism Center, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting, Seattle Washington." (Previously distributed to the panel)
- ⁵² Undated, unsigned documents received by WTO ARC 6/6/00, "WTO Arrest Procedures for Platoons," "WTO Field Prisoner Processing Team Procedures," "WTO Sand Point Prisoner Processing Team Procedures."

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- ⁵³ 9/10/99, Finkle, Mike, e-mail to Ted Inkley, "Re: WTO – Deliberative Process/Attorney-Client—Update on Planning"
- ⁵⁴ Low, Neil, 11/19/99, Seattle Police Department Memorandum to All Concerned, "WTO Operations Order for the 'Flying Squad'."
- ⁵⁵ Halpert, Helen, 11/10/99, Memorandum to "Members of the WTO Intergovernmental Workgroup", re: "November 10th meeting summary."
- ⁵⁶ WSP, undated, WTO Conference Prisoner Processing Procedures, and "Potential Factual Scenarios and charges for WTO Conference Protests."
- ⁵⁷ Fagerstrom, Kevin, 10/25/99, King County Sheriff's Office Memorandum to Listed Personnel, re: "The Plan"
- ⁵⁸ Seattle Police Department After-Action Report, Appendix B, p. 64.
- ⁵⁹ Reichert, Rob, 12/13/99, Memo to Doug Thoet, WSP Traffic Investigative Division, "After Action Report—WTO"
- ⁶⁰ Caldwell, Cynthia, 10/18/99, E-mail to Guy Pratt, "PPT Check Up."
- ⁶¹ Halpert, Helen, 11/10/99, Memorandum to "Members of the WTO Intergovernmental Workgroup", re: "November 10th meeting summary."
- ⁶² Reichert, Rob, 12/13/99, Memo to Doug Thoet, WSP Traffic Investigative Division, "After Action Report—WTO"
- ⁶³ Low, Neil, 11/19/99, Seattle Police Department Memorandum to All Concerned, "WTO Operations Order for the 'Flying Squad'."
- ⁶⁴ Caldwell, Cynthia, 10/18/99, E-mail to Guy Pratt, "PPT Check Up."
- ⁶⁵ Caldwell, Cynthia, 11/5/99, E-mail to Steve Paulsen, "Demo Man. Staffing -Pris. Proc."
- ⁶⁶ SPD After Action Report, p. 65.
- ⁶⁷ Reichert, Rob, 12/13/99, Memo to Doug Thoet, WSP Traffic Investigative Division, "After Action Report—WTO"
- ⁶⁸ Reichert, Rob, 12/13/99, Memo to Doug Thoet, WSP Traffic Investigative Division, "After Action Report—WTO"
- ⁶⁹ Lorette, Allan, undated, WTO After Action Report (Criminal Intelligence Section)
- ⁷⁰ Seattle Police Department After-Action Report, p. 18.
- ⁷¹ Pugel, Jim, undated, World Trade Organization Conference Demonstration Management Draft After Action Report. (Sent to Panel 2 members on 4/20/00)
- ⁷² Pratt, Guy, undated, "Prisoner Processing Chronology."
- ⁷³ Seattle Police Department After-Action Report, Appendix B, p. 65.
- ⁷⁴ Allen, Debbie, 1/10/2000, Seattle Police Department Memorandum to Brent Wingstrand, "WTO After-Action Report."
- ⁷⁵ Paxton, Kathy, 4/19/00, Interview with Alec Fisk.
- ⁷⁶ Waldmann, Ray, 3/6/00, Interview with Alec Fisk and Kirsten Evans.
- ⁷⁷ Orton, Keith, 9/13/99, E-mail sent to Ed Parks, Samk@seattlechamber.com and others, contains *Sunday Times* (London), 09/12/99, "Anti-city anarchists plot global riot".
- ⁷⁸ *Seattle P-I*, 9/15/99, "Ruckus Society getting set to disrupt WTO conference"; *Seattle Times*, 9/20/00, "Protesters hit training camp to prepare for WTO meeting."
- ⁷⁹ *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 11/6/99, "Walk out on summit, Seattleites urged."
- ⁸⁰ *Seattle Times*, 11/23/99, "Both sides fear overreactions as WTO nears."
- ⁸¹ See #3
- ⁸² *Seattle Weekly*, 9/2/99, "The new anarchists."
- ⁸³ *Seattle Times*, 09/10/99, "Protesters vigorously practice for WTO meeting in Seattle".
- ⁸⁴ "Mass Nonviolent Direct Action, November 30, 1999," [www .agitprop.org/artandrevolution/wto/n30html](http://www.agitprop.org/artandrevolution/wto/n30html) website, printed 11/09/99 and submitted to WTO ARC with Mayor's Office files (part of a packet of protester materials).
- ⁸⁵ Public Safety Committee Draft Operations Guide, 11/3/99, Annex U "Escorts", p. 3. (Previously distributed – very thick)
- ⁸⁶ Letter from Norm Stamper to Ronald Legan, June 28, 1999
- ⁸⁷ SPD Directive 99-82, Credentialing Procedures, issued 11/3/99
- ⁸⁸ Public Safety Committee, 11/09/99, World Trade Organization Conference Public Safety Committee Operations Plan (p. 14) – sent previously (thinner document)
- ⁸⁹ Letter from Norm Stamper to Ronald Legan, March 25, 1999
- ⁹⁰ Letter from Norm Stamper and Brent Wingstrand to Darrell Hughes, Tacoma PD, June 29, 1999
- ⁹¹ "Revised Motorcycle Escort Training Proposal", Memo from Richard Belshay to Brent Wingstrand, June 21, 1999
- ⁹² Letter from Norm Stamper to Ronald Legan, June 28, 1999
- ⁹³ SPD Directive 99-82, Credentialing Procedures, issued 11/3/99
- ⁹⁴ WTO Accreditation Form - Lisa Ross, issued Nov. 24, 1999 - NOT included because it requires redaction due to personal information (SSNs, phone #s)
- ⁹⁵ Waldmann, Ray, 1/13/2000, Final Committee Reports [SHO], p.4, 7
- ⁹⁶ Interview with Cliff Traisman and Keith Orton, March 2000
- ⁹⁷ *Seattle Times*, Oct. 9, 1999, "Paramount drops curtain on WTO protesters, cites "security reasons".
- ⁹⁸ Email from Fred Gerdes to Lauri McNeal, Oct. 23, 1999
- ⁹⁹ Letter from Lauri McNeal to Ed Joiner, Nov. 24, 1999

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- ¹⁰⁰ Interview with Pat Davis and Ray Waldmann, March 2000
- ¹⁰¹ Paxton, Kathy, 4/19/00, Interview with Alec Fisk.
- ¹⁰² Waldmann, Ray, 3/6/2000, Interview with Alec Fisk and Kirsten Evans, WTO ARC.
- ¹⁰³ *Wall Street Journal*, 4/23/99, "Seattle is bracing..." (Washington Wire)
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- ¹⁰⁶ Northwest Security Services, Inc., 10/28/99, "Security Alert".
- ¹⁰⁷ Reed, Dick, 11/2/99, email, "FWD[2]:RE: Protest These Timber Corporations Nov. 4".
- ¹⁰⁸ "Seattle City-wide Walkout," 4 p. document printed 11/09/1999, <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/8771/nowto.html>
- ¹⁰⁹ Global Action, 11/14/99, email to N30 listserv, "Fwd: Steal Something Day! 11/26/99 (fwd)".
- ¹¹⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting."
- ¹¹¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 11/17/99, "Threat Update: World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting."
- ¹¹² 9/27/99, "City-Wide Communications Plan for the World Trade Organization Conference: Status Report".
- ¹¹³ Schell, Paul, 10/29/99, letter to Seattle business owners.
- ¹¹⁴ *Seattle Times*, 11/10/99, "We're ready for anything, officials say".
- ¹¹⁵ Schell, Paul, 11/12/99, memo to City employees, "World Trade Organization (WTO) Conference".
- ¹¹⁶ Walath, Lorna, 11/15/99, email to City department heads, "WTO Impact on City Employees/Business Hours".
- ¹¹⁷ *Seattle Times*, 11/25/99, "Retailers worry WTO protests may disrupt business".
- ¹¹⁸ *Seattle Times*, 11/25/99, "Parking won't be easy."
- ¹¹⁹ *Seattle Times*, 11/26/99, "WTO: Why it wound up here - in rainy holiday season".
- ¹²⁰ Seattle School District, 11/24/99, news release, "Seattle Schools Will Operate on Conference Schedule in Response to WTO March on November 30".
- ¹²¹ *Seattle Times*, 11/27/99, "Students to get extended weekend".
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- ¹²³ Joiner, Ed, 8/9/99, Letter to Judge Helen Halpert, Seattle Municipal Court
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- ¹²⁵ Seattle Police Department, November 1999, World Trade Organization Fact Sheet.
- ¹²⁶ Kerrigan, Dave, 5/18/99, "Notes from World Trade Organization Coordinating Committee Discussion - 5-13-99."
- ¹²⁷ Dively, Dwight, 9/17/99, memo to Paul Schell, "Weekly Report".
- ¹²⁸ Schell, Paul, 10/1/99, email to Schell Mail subscribers, "Schell Mail #39 - The WTO Ministerial".
- ¹²⁹ Schell, Paul, 10/29/99, Letter to Seattle Business Owners.
- ¹³⁰ 9/21/99, "Planning for WTO Sessions in Seattle - Multi-Jurisdiction Committee of Public Relations Reps, September 21 Meeting Summary".
- ¹³¹ Shea, Michael, 9/28/99, email to Billy Jack, Dinah Kinney, et al., "Labor march on Tuesday, November 30, 1999".
- ¹³² Ripley, Steve, 11/18/99, email to Vivian Phillips et al, "WTO Traffic Alert: e-mail subscription service".
- ¹³³ *Seattle Times*, 11/18/99, "Seattle frets but gets ready for WTO conference".
- ¹³⁴ Mayor's Office, 11/22/99, press release, "The City of Seattle Seeks Compromise with Protest Group to Keep Downtown Accessible".
- ¹³⁵ Schubert-Knapp, Katherine, 10/28/99, email to Vivian Phillips, Lisa Ross, and JoEllen Warner, "PIO Positions/Roles".
- ¹³⁶ Anonymous, Undated, "Summary of Events, WTO Ministerial Conference, Geneva, May 1998." First line states, "The following is based on information received from the FBI." Part of an information packet sent to PSC Subcommittee members by SPD Lt. Dick Reed.
- ¹³⁷ Anonymous, undated, "General Recap of 11/9 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS," received by WTO ARC staff 5/30/00 with other SPD intelligence materials.
- ¹³⁸ Anonymous (Seattle Police Dept.), "Recap of 11/23 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS."
- ¹³⁹ Anonymous (Seattle Police Dept.), "Recap of 11/23 Intelligence Briefing Paper as Prepared by CIS."
- ¹⁴⁰ Lorette, Allan (SPD Lieutenant), undated, "WTO After Action Report"
- ¹⁴¹ Lorette, Allan (SPD Lieutenant), undated, "WTO After Action Report"
- ¹⁴² Lorette, Allan (SPD Lieutenant), undated, "WTO After Action Report"
- ¹⁴³ SPD After Action Report, 4/11/2000, p. 51.
- ¹⁴⁴ Wingstrand, Brent, 10/6/99, E-mail message to Harry Bailey, Richard Belshay, Alan Bernstein and others, "Re: Important meeting with Secret Service."
- ¹⁴⁵ Seattle Police Department Policies and Procedures, Section 2.031, Unusual Occurrences, p. 3
- ¹⁴⁶ Seattle Police Department: Crowd Control Subcommittee: Equipment Needs
- ¹⁴⁷ Moffat, Bill (SPD), undated, "Chemical Agent After-Action Report," p. 1

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- ¹⁴⁸ Chemical Agent Response Team Operations Plan, revised November 13, 1999
- ¹⁴⁹ Moffat, Bill (SPD), undated, "Chemical Agent After-Action Report," p. 2.
- ¹⁵⁰ R.M. McCarthy & Associates, July 2000, "An Independent Review of the World Trade Organization Conference Disruptions in Seattle, Washington November 29-December 3, 1999," p. 96.
- ¹⁵¹ R.M. McCarthy & Associates, July 2000, "An Independent Review of the World Trade Organization Conference Disruptions in Seattle, Washington November 29-December 3, 1999."
- ¹⁵² R.M. McCarthy & Associates, July 2000, pp. 188-190.
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- ¹⁵⁷ Griffin, Ron, 5/14/99, E-mail to Larry Mayes and Denise Pentony (KCSO), "CRT Supplemental Budget."
- ¹⁵⁸ SPD After Action Report, p. 31.
- ¹⁵⁹ R.M. McCarthy & Associates, July 2000, "An Independent Review of the World Trade Organization Conference Disruptions in Seattle, Washington November 29-December 3, 1999," p. 126
- ¹⁶⁰ Joiner, Ed, date not noted, Memo to "Operations Bureau Commanders", "Scenarios and Intelligence Information." Approximate date provided by A/C Ed Joiner in an interview with WTO ARC Panel 2 members on 7/13/2000.
- ¹⁶¹ SPD After Action Report, p. 31, WTO ARC has not received any documentation of the number & identities of participants, content, instructor, or source of training materials.
- ¹⁶² SPD After Action Report, p. 31; SPD timesheets.
- ¹⁶³ "Seattle Police Department Event Overtime Summary," various timesheets dated between 8/19/99 and 11/22/99, which state "Respiratory Protection Fit Testing" and "World Trade Planning" or "WTO Unit P1117" with various precincts listed as locations.
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